Feminism, realism, and universalism

Introduction: the practice of a priori universalising

Feminist contributions can claim a good deal of the credit for modem social theory displaying increasing sensitivity to the dangers of ovcrgcncralising. Fundamental here is the recognition that values, experiences, objectives, and common-sense interpretations of dominant groups may be merely that; there is nothing especially natural or necessarily universal about them. All claims, whether made from within the academy or without, whether cautiously or boldly formulated, etc., arc made from particular positions by interested parties. No person or group can reasonably profess a neutral, detached, unbiased perspective; all understandings achieved are partial (as well as fallible and likely to be transient). The practice of universalising a priori, of merely asserting/assuming the widespread validity/relcvance of some position is now widely recognised as, at best, a methodological mistake, and one that can carry significant political consequence.²

As is well known, however, it has proven all too easy to slide from a position of opposing the practice of a priori universalising to one of more or less opposing the endeavour of generalising altogether. In particular, once the basis for treating a dominant stance or approach as universally legitimate has been successfully called into question it has often proven difficult to avoid concluding that all approaches or stances are as legitimate as each other.

With regards to some issues this sort of reaction is unproblematic, even facilitating. But this is not the case with all matters, and especially, I think, with respect to broader projects of illumination and human emancipation. In particular, theorists have found it difficult to defend a notion of objectivity or progress in knowledge, or to sustain any basis for an emancipatory politics, where these objectives arc of central concern to many feminists. The conclusion too often drawn is that, even in regard to matters such as these, all we can safely say is that there arc differences.

My limited objective here is to argue that, in addressing these latter sorts of difficulties, there are possible advantages to feminist explanatory and emancipatory projects from engaging (or engaging more fully) in the sort of explicit ontological analysis associated with modem versions (at least) of scientific realism.

In encouraging this sort of stance I do not wish to suggest that scientific realism or ontological considerations are entirely absent from feminist thought. Indeed, I think it is impossible that they could be. But I think it possible that ontological commitments are too rarely rendered explicit. And when the question of realism is raised (in whatever form) at all, the latter, it seems to me, is mostly treated in an overly guarded way in much feminist thought, as if accepting any explicitly realist perspective is necessarily problematic.

I am not alone in this perception. Caroline New (1998, p. 2), for example, recently records that in modern feminist thought ‘realism’ seems ‘tainted’, and writes of ‘realism’s current resounding unpopularity among feminist theorists’ (ibid., p. 12). She also suggests that providing a reasonably ‘robust’ defence of feminist standpoint theory’s realism is more ‘than its current proponents seem willing to risk’ (ibid., p. 6).

Others caution distance. Martha Nussbaum (whose argument for grounding ethical theory in the nature of human capacities is undoubtedly realist) finds the standing of realism to be sufficiently low as to caution ‘that it would appear strategically wise for an ethical and political view that seeks broad support not to rely on the truth of metaphysical realism’ (Nussbaum 1995, p. 69).³

Some feel the need to include a forthright disclaimer. Donna Haraway provides a prominent example. Despite setting out a perspective that seems so clearly to embrace scientific or ontological realism,⁴ Haraway seemingly feels that credibility rests upon expressly denying that this is so: ‘The approach I am recommending is not a version of “realism”, which has proved a rather poor way of engaging with the world’s active agency’ (Haraway 1988, p. 260).

My worry is that this negative or distancing orientation can result in legitimate realist considerations being played down to an extent that may actually be debilitating for the feminist project, not least in preventing it from dealing as effectively as it might with the sorts of tensions or difficulties already noted. My aim here, then, is to caution against any blanket rejection of realist-type analysis as ultimately unnecessarily constraining of feminist thinking and advance.

I start, though, by defining some of my terms. Following this I move, in the main part of the paper, to indicate the sorts of differences that I think explicit realist/ontological analysis can make.