Final comments

I have observed that explicit ontological analysis is conspicuously, if erroneously, downplayed in much of feminist theorising, and I have suggested that this neglect is unfortunate in that ontology matters for any would-be projects of illumination and emancipation. I have provided some illustrations to back up this claim.

Whatever the reason for the downplaying of such realist concerns, the point bears emphasising that realists arc no more committed to absolutism than relativists arc committed to irrcalism. The relevant question, rather, is: which realist and which relativist positions arc sustainable in a given context? I have argued here, in effect, for an ontological realism and an epistemological relativism, which together amount to a rejection of a judgmental relativism in favour of a judgmental rationality.²³ In this I have defended a particular social theory that preserves and endorses, indeed itself incorporates, the impulse behind the ‘deconstructive’ turn in feminist theory, but which simultaneously, through its emphasis on ontology, avoids the self-subversion of total (including a judgmental) relativism.

The particular theory of reality defended is of a structured and open world. It is a conception that recognises that in our everyday practices, all of us, as complexly structured, socially and culturally situated, purposeful and needy individuals, knowledgeably and capably negotiate complex, shifting, only partially grasped, and contested structures of power, rules, relations, and other, possibly relatively enduring but nevertheless transient and action-dependent, social resources at our disposal. Ontological analysis provides an insight into this reality.

Thus when Deirdre McCloskey, in the manner of others, cautions against any embracing of 'material realism’ on the grounds that 'What is at issue here is the philosopher’s construct, Reality, a thing deeper than what is necessary for daily life’ (McCloskey 1997, pp. 14-15), the primary error lies in supposing there is little depth to 'daily life’, that philosophy deals (or inevitably claims to deal) with a reality apart from that continually encountered by us all. The mistaken presumption, in effect, is that social reality, and specifically ‘daily life’, is reducible to the actual course of social events. This reduction of reality to experience and its immediate objects is a mistake that ontological analysis allows us to rectify.

Now I am aware, finally, that the above outline is rather schematic and hurried. I suspect many will remain rather unconvinced by some or all of the sketches provided. As it happens, I do find that the broad perspective elaborated currently constitutes as sustainable (explanatorily powerful) an account as any with which I am familiar (sec Lawson 1997a). But I should re-emphasise that most of the preceding discussion is provided first and foremost with the intent of being illustrative. My primary objective here is not so much to persuade others to accept precisely the conceptions developed as to suggest that such conceptions, or explicit ontological analyses of the sort grounding them, do deserve consideration by more feminists. My chief purpose here is to contribute to removing what I take to be unnecessary obstacles to a particular set of debates, with the hope of transforming or even initiating a further strand to a particular conversation. For it may just be (from where I am situated it seems likely) that if feminists, including feminist economists, allow realism, and in particular explicit ontological analysis, to come more fully out of the margin, the opportunities for advance opened up thereby will prove to be to everyone’s advantage.