The reality of sex

Having introduced and illustrated some critical realist concepts and distinctions, I can now go on to sketch a critical realist theory of gender. The much criticised ‘second stage’ feminist distinction between sex and gender is a good place to begin.

The sex-gender distinction has been criticised as ‘caught within a surface/ depth opposition’ (Felski 1997, p. 17) akin to that of the much disputed base/ superstructure distinction. From a critical realist perspective, however, the stratified nature of the sex-gender distinction is a strength. A critical realist theory of sex and gender would indeed identify structures at lower levels (the ‘base’ or ‘depth’), and, in a non-rcductionist way, would seek to explain how these lower-level structures condition possibilities at higher levels (the ‘superstructure’ or ‘surface’). It would not make the mistake of assuming that the second terms were mere expressions of the first, or that the causal relationship was invariably one way. Let us sec how this could work for sex and gender.

Sexual dimorphism is a necessary aspect of sexual reproduction, which is in turn an evolved characteristic of the human species. Through the process of sexual dimorphism, foetuses which initially have the same morphology differentiate, resulting in differently sexed bodies with different causal powers. Our human bodies enable different reproductive roles for females and for males, different sexual possibilities (famously, multiple orgasms for females), and by the same token limit what we can do. Little boys discover that they have no wombs in which to grow babies, that they will never have breasts with which to feed them. Little girls discover they cannot urinate standing up without getting wet legs.

Sexual difference in humans is therefore real, and largely extra-discursive. The sex categories arc ‘good abstractions’, bringing together characteristics that arc internally (not just nominally or formally) connected (Danermark ct al. 2002). Of course, social mechanisms play a role in the allocation of sex categories and thus in the resultant social divisions into maleness and fcmalcncss. Since categorisation is a social process, social mechanisms must always be crucially involved. Where the natural kinds of the world have fuzzy edges (or where there arc no natural kinds) there is more scope for the social construction of boundaries. Sexual difference in humans is not entirely dichotomous (more of that in a moment), but nearly so. The division into malcncss and has some slight cultural variability, depending on local theories about sexual difference. The reality of sexual difference, however, is a different question from the social processes through which sex categories arc allocated.

In humans, as in other mammals, the features of biological sex - chromosonal and hormonal differences affecting development, genital formation, and the

Sex and gender 89 ‘secondary’ bodily differences that develop from puberty - almost always fall into two clusters, female and male, with a very small percentage of ambiguous or mixed cases in between (Rogers 2001). Within each group there is, indeed, more variation than most human societies like to admit. Most of the variation within the groups of males and females is not attributable to intcrscxuality. The size and shape of sexual parts, the amount and distribution of hair, body fat, muscles, and tone of voice, all vary just as nose shapes and hair colours vary, but the social pressure to exaggerate sexual dimorphism leads us to underestimate the ranges of variation. A woman whose voice is deeper than many men’s voices is not therefore intcrsexual. Intcrscxuality implies either chromosomal difference, or that the developmental process of differentiation was for some reason compromised or incomplete. The process through which foetus, and then infant and child, develop as male or female (or intersexed) is only very loosely related to the socio-psychological process of the construction of a gendered self.

Human sexes, then, arc ‘natural kinds’, categories so-called because they tell us something about the causal structures of the world. While the causal properties of a natural kind arc contingently clustered (for example breasts which can lactate, soft skin, a certain vocal range, a womb, little and fine facial hair), the presence of some of these properties renders the presence of others more likely - because there are common underlying properties that tend to maintain the clusters of features (Keil 1989, p. 43).

These underlying properties continue to exist even in those cases which do not readily fit into male and female clusters. In fact, ambiguous cases arc only explicable in terms of the evolved norm of dimorphism, as Hull explains:

Approximately 99.6% ... of all humans arc bom biologically male or female. Because several processes are involved in the sexual development, the laws do not operate with one hundred percent predictability ... hypospadias, the condition in which the male urethral opening extends along the underside of the penis, is ... made explicable when the common tissue origin of all genitalia is acknowledged. The condition reflects a shortage of the hormones necessary to convert the bipotential foetal genitalia into a male penis; in other words, hypospadias is a penis with a female urethra... Thus, the phenomenon of intersexuality is a reflection of the causal structure of sex, a real structure that intimately links male and female bodies while explaining differences. It is not the effect of a ‘resistance’ to discourse or a lawless chaos or even a continuum.

(prc-publication version of Hull 2006)

Hull goes on to point out that a male adult who wants to grow breasts, for whatever reason, must ingest large quantities of oestrogen. The mechanism on which he must draw to produce a form of intcrscxuality are also those which produce sexual dimorphism.

To sum up, sexual difference - the differentiation of most humans into males and females, and of a minority into intelligible intersexed forms ofhuman beings - is basic in two senses. First, there arc real differences between the emergent properties of male and female bodies, their physical capacities and vulnerabilities. For fear of being misunderstood, let me repeat that we arc talking about tendencies here, not inevitabilities - the tendency of males to be more muscular, of females to menstruate and lactate in certain circumstances, the greater average vulnerability of the male foetus and so on. Other mechanisms, such as gendered differences in the distribution of nourishment or amount of physical exercise, can stop these tendencies resulting in the outcomes mentioned. Second, sexual difference is the referent for the many ways of conceptualising sexed bodies, representations which legitimise various gender orders.