The long-term consequences of the success of the MPB

In principle, the aim of consultations, information campaigns, and other tools applied in the political process is to help politicization, which, according to de Wilde (2011), includes a growing salience of issues, polarization of opinions and the pool of actors involved in the decision-making processes (social movements, experts, etc.). However, as Bognar et al. (2019) argue, though the Hungarian case might be seen as a successful case for politicization at first sight, this is hardly the occurrence - although immigration, as the core issue, became extremely salient, the polarization of opinions was reduced to duality. This type of polarization leads to the creation of mental borders between social groups, making public discussion impossible. Also, although the audience involved in the decisionmaking processes seems to be larger than before, the consequence of the national consultations and information campaigns is the exclusion of mediating actors and experts, and consequently, of alternative opinions from the debates (Bernath &. Messing 2015).

We assume, therefore, that the biased politization process based on the success of the MPB, in the long run, serves the de-democratization processes of Hungary, which have gained much attention in recent years (Bogaards 2018; Bozoki & Hegediis 2018; Cianetti et al. 2018; Freedom House 2018). Although this literature focuses on the regulation and the state of democratic institutions, we argue that the de-democratization of the country is a result of the efforts to secure popular support and to disarm the challengers. As these efforts are manifested in techniques preventing the possibility of any critical attempts, and as the regime placed emphasis on these techniques, it became more and more radical in the sense of decomposing democratic institutions.

Thus, we argue, that ‘de-democratization’ is best understood when we focus on the way in which governments fight for popular support and legitimacy sanctioned by the masses. We argue that when the main tool of gaining this support is the Moral Panic Button, the result is not only increasing popular support, but the creation of different realities for the supporters and non-supporters of the regime. This divided reality draws boundaries between social groups and gives birth to harsh in-group outgroup conflicts. In such a situation, the government’s only option is to maintain its support to further this process, which leads to the increasing control over the public sphere and the demolition of democratic institutions. In the constant fight to ‘save the nation,’ the destruction of democratic institutions appears as a necessary means.

This process fits the ongoing debate on hybrid regimes. According to Diamond (2002), until the second half of the twentieth century, the decision whether a regime was autocratic or democratic was easier, since, autocracies applied obvious forms of oppression to their opposition. In the last decades, however, the number of autocratic regimes that apply some democratic elements has been growing. They hold elections allowing limited competition, consequently allowing the existence of an opposition and non-state-con-trolled organizations and press. As they apply the scenery of a democracy, they claim the title as well, although it is quite clear that most of these regimes are far from being democratic - elections are hardly free and fair, the conditions of a real electoral competition are missing, most of the press is state-controlled through state ownership or by other means, and individual freedoms are limited.

Zakaria’s (1997) concept of illiberal democracies also connects the rise of regimes with elections (democracies) and disrespecting constitutionalism (liberalism) with the second half of the twentieth century. Zakaria claims that only the West understands democracy as a system requiring more than competitive elections. Other parts of the world equal democracy with the existence of competitive elections, which are not necessarily accompanied by the respect of constitutionalism, the rule of law or respect for individual freedoms (Zakaria 1997).

Although there is much discussion about the existence of semi-demo-cratic, hybrid regimes, illiberal or defective democracies, most of this scholarship is optimistic in the sense that they interpret the appearance of these regimes as a move from authoritarianism towards democracy. Even when the weaknesses of new democracies are discussed, they are attributed to the youth of these regimes, arguing that new democracies cannot be fully democratic in all examined aspects immediately, as they need to develop (Bogaards 2018).

Many of these scholars argue, however, that in the last years, the reversal of democratic transitions can be observed. In this reversal, it seems, Hungary plays a leading role (Csillag & Szelényi 2015; Kornai 2015; Bogaards 2018; Bozôki &. Hegedüs 2018; Cianetti et al. 2018).

However, even in these attempts, scholars mostly try to describe how the regimes look, without explaining how governments are able to exploit the existing value system and the dissatisfaction with political institutions, and how they are able to transform social structures and institutions to support their attempts to maintain their power.

Therefore, to explain the process of de-democratization, we have to pay attention to the use of political communication and the media as well, and in particular, to the technology of the MPB. Through the centralization of the media, and by applying national consultations and billboard campaigns, the government initiated a series of moral panics through which their preferred reality is presented.

As to the long-term impact of the MPB on the value system of the Hungarian society, if we accept solidarity as a basic European value, and the ability to think politically as a premise of a democratic society, then we see the MPB as a threat to the European value system. Even more so, since there are signs that the Hungarian technology appears to be transferred to other countries, in some cases directly (Macedonia, Slovenia), and in other cases, less directly (Poland). Therefore, the MPB Hungarian specialist think tank recently established a subsidiary in London, as an inheritor of the infamous Finkelstein emporium (see Balogh 2019).

In the long run, MPB seems to have the same role as New Speak has in Orwell’s anti-utopian Oceania (Lexico Dictionaries n.d.), and the resulting society might also be similar - a brainwashed and dumb mass society without any communication skills, unable to form political opinion, and only sensitive to centrally initiated values.