A new organisation to build the airport under the owners’ control
After abandoning the private tendering process, the board chaired by the mayor of Berlin, Wowereit, and the prime minister of Brandenburg, Platzeck, decided to build the airport under the owners’ control12 on the basis of planning efforts by HT/IVG. This decision by the board significantly changed the organisational structure of FBB. Now FBB was tasked with leading the airport construction. Opening was now scheduled for 2008/2009, two years earlier than envisaged by the HT/IVG consortia and much more ambitious. It was a megaproject ‘squeezed’ into an existing corporate governance framework designed for a going concern (Wendler, 2015, 5). From 2004 on, this effort was led by Thomas Weyer, COO for technology/construction, who was previously in charge of the construction of the new airport in Athens for Hochtief and their bid for BBI. Weyer aimed to have a single general contractor for design, construction planning and construction work.
However, FBB did not appoint a general contractor. Instead, the Planungsgemeinschaft (joint planning venture) Berlin Brandenburg International (PG-BBI) was formed and hired as a general planner in January 2005. PG-BBI was a joint venture of the architects Gerkan, Marg und Partner (GMP) and JSK Architekten,13 with Ingenieurgesellschaft Kruck (IGK-IGR) responsible for financial supervision and coordination. The task of PG-BBI was expanded to include the review and supervision of the general contractor’s detailed design and ongoing construction performance, suggesting a clear conflict of interest.14 Site management and construction control were put into one role: PG-BBI was commissioned with both the general planning and the construction supervision. FBB also hired WSP/CBP as project manager/coordinators. WSP/CBP, a well-known international group for project controlling, was then replaced between 2008 and 2009 by another such controller, Drees & Sommer. This indicates that the issue of project control was initially given high priority.15
After nearly 15 years of political discussions and planning, the construction of the new airport was launched on 5 September 200616 with a public ceremony that included representatives of the three owners and the new CEO, Rainer Schwarz (former CEO of Diisseldorf Airport). Compared to the earlier plans under the 1996 ‘Konsensbeschluss’ that envisaged opening the airport in 2007, the delays already experienced after the agreement on the airport location demonstrates just how difficult it was to commence planning and start constructionin a speedy manner. To strengthen the new management responsibility for construction, the airport company created a new group structure in 2007 by merging BBF Holding GmbH and FBS GmbH (responsible for SXF) with four business areas: aviation management for Tegel and Tempelhof airports; aviation management for the BBI project; planning and construction; and real estate management. The new company combined both the operation experience of the existing airports and the construction expertise of the BBI.
On 9 October 2007, the initial tender for the BER passenger terminal, for bridges and the luggage system, was annulled by the FBB, citing price agreements between the four bidders, but that was never proven in court.17 However the retendering process gave FBB the opportunity to get more involved in the process, and it was also under political pressure to do so. FBB calculated that by undertaking the detailed design itself, €350 million could be saved. Furthermore, it gave the politicians involved an option to push for multiple tenders to get more local companies involved in the construction.18 In the end, 37 multiple lots were distributed to more than 50 companies, enabling smaller regional businesses to participate in the construction of the terminal. Even individual tasks were awarded to different companies.19
Bernd Pütter of Hochtief argued that breaking the project up into lots would make it more complex and result in a completion date much later than originally planned (Wendler, 2015). Additionally, the costs actually rose with the new tender. With the exception of the baggage handling system, new bids were 55 to 175 per cent higher than previous offers, meaning that the construction costs of the passenger terminal alone increased to approximately €1.1 billion.2"
While FBB was now responsible for the detailed design and interface with around 50 contractors, it did not revise its project structure and internal processes accordingly, nor did FBB management allow sufficient time for detailed planning, because they were not willing to postpone the planned completion set for October 2011 (Diekmann, 2012; Rothengatter, 2013). Perhaps influenced by this, Thomas Weyer, FBB’s COO and technical director, left his post during the crucial tendering phase for the terminal, to become the general manager at Munich Airport in August 2008. Weyer was replaced by Dr Manfred A. Kört-gen who had before led the reconstruction of the Düsseldorf Airport, terminal, after the fire there in 1996.21
