A fourth special trait of transitional justice with respect to international cooperation is that cheating is not an intrinsic problem, which also relates to the notion that transitional justice is not necessarily a zero-sum game. That said, it is possible that supposedly cooperative actors could sabotage transitional justice efforts by facilitating the escape of, destroying incriminating evidence about, or bribing a judge presiding over the trial of an alleged atrocity perpetrator because, for example, that suspect had been a former ally. But both the frequency of these activities and the extent to which they endanger the survival or vital interests of other actors are rare. There is no “special peril of defection” due to cheating within transitional justice institutions that could “inflict a decisive defeat on the victim state.”20 This phenomenon contrasts markedly with the security realm, including issues such as weapons proliferation, where the possibility and consequences of breaking agreements are real and significant. Given the absence of a cheating problem and few concerns over relative gains, neorealists are less likely to be skeptical of cooperation in this issue-area.