Walling Europe

We can find numerous examples around the world which suggest that actual concrete walls seldom work for the purpose for which they are intended. As soon as a wall or fence is erected, people will try to cross it - it is needless to underline the ineffectiveness of such constructions in alleviating the very causes of people’s movement in the first place. Walls, however, seem more effective on paper. I mean here how EU border and migration policies and practices actually play out. The EU has been vastly expanding its external border control force and has hiked expenditure on constructing “Fortress Europe” in a bid to discourage unwanted migrants.

A fitting, if partial, example of this was the 2007-13 Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme (SOLID), for which Directorate-General for Home Affairs of the European Commission allocated a budget of almost €4 billion. This General Programme consisted of four instruments: The External Borders Fund (EBF); the European Return Fund (RF); the European Refugee

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Fund (ERF); and the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals (EIF). Almost half the entire budget was directed to EBF activities, equipment and technological infrastructure focused on the control of the Schengen area's external borders, while only 17% was allocated to support asylum procedures, reception services and the resettlement and integration of refugees (European Commission, 2019). The contrast between expenditure on border control and refugee support was considerably more pronounced in EU funding allocations to individual member states at the EU’s external borders. Bulgaria affords a good example: Approximately 8% of the total amount received under the SOLID Programme was allocated for activities funded by the Refugee Fund, and approximately 74% by the External Borders Fund.

In 2014, the EU established two new funds to replace the four under the SOLID Programme: The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF); and the Internal Security Fund (ISF). This represented an increased spending of almost 50% in this area. Since the increased inflow of asylum seekers in 2015, the funding has not only been further increased but has increasingly focused on border securitization at the expanse of more solidary action. In particular, the budget of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has soared from an initial €6.2 million in 2005 to €333 million in 2O19.^: In September 2019, the Council of the EU supported a budget of €420.6 million for 2020 for Frontex, a 32.4% increase from 2019, to establish a standing corps of 10,000 border guards by 2027 (Council of the EU 2019). The total EU contribution from the 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework to Frontex increased from the initial commitment of €628 million to €1,638 billion (European Parliament 2018: 15).

Acknowledging that “migration and border management will remain a challenge in the future”, the Commission proposed to almost triple funding for migration and border management to €34.9 billion during the 2021-7 EU budgetary period, compared with €13 billion in the previous period (European Commission: 2018a). An unprecedented level of funding will be channelled through two primary funds, the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF, the current AMIF) and the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF, replacing the current ISF). “Learning the lessons of the past”, the Commission (2018) defined the “crucial areas of migration and border management” where the hinds will be allocated as: (1) securing the EU’s external borders (strengthening external borders, a stronger and more efficient visa policy); and (2) supporting a robust, realistic and fair migration policy (a stronger and more efficient European asylum system, greater support for legal migration and integration and faster and more frequent returns). In addition to the €21.3 billion allocated for border management overall, a separate new Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) has been created, worth more than €9.3 billion. The creation of a dedicated border management fund reflects the fact that both border management and internal security have become increasingly pressing priorities - each worthy of dedicated and more targeted financing instruments - and that the "effective protection of the EU's external borders is crucial to manage migration and ensure internal security” (European Commission, 2018b).

The rhetoric employed suggests that to safeguard a safe interior from the insecure and threatening exterior, the EU must intercept those attempting to migrate “illegally” into the European space. Migration became a security issue, perhaps more distinctly than ever, with the establishment of a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) in 2016. This followed the 2016 announcement of Jean-Claude Juncker (2016), President of the European Commission, in his State of the Union address, in which he stated that “[w]e need to know who is crossing our borders” and demanded that “an automated system to determine who will be allowed to travel to Europe" be created for the purpose. The system was heralded as the “the missing link in our border management, connecting the dots with our migration and security policies” needed to guarantee that "Europe’s openness does not come at the cost of its security” (Avramopoulos, 2016, author’s emphasis). Migration was established as a security issue even more profoundly in the statements of other leading officials, according to whom “[t]errorists and criminals don’t care much for national borders” (King, 2016) because “[s]ecuring our borders and protecting our citizens is our first priority” (Timmermans, 2016). In short, to quote the Commissioner for Migration, Internal Affairs and Citizenship of the European Commission, Dimitris Avramopoulos (2017), “Europe has had to deal with two parallel and simultaneous crises on migration and security”.

However, these policies have thus far done little to halt "illegal” migration, though they have certainly made it more difficult. The securitization tendency and the related effort to restrict migration have created a self-referential fencing which feeds itself insatiably. The more movement is restricted, the more crossing becomes illegal, and the more control is needed. The more fences are built, the more personnel are needed to control them. As border control technology becomes more sophisticated, so does the smuggling industry. As the stakes get higher, so do the potential profits, which in turn make illegal activities increasingly lucrative (Laine, 2018b: 292). The smuggling networks are making billions from human misery (Mohdin, 2016). The more restrictions are placed, the more people are pushed into irregularity, forced into more dangerous conditions and taking bigger risks. Ultimately, the more fences and walls are built, the more people die (Figure 4.1). The EU’s migration policy priorities have been geared towards sealing its borders and pushing back those seeking access to better lives, rather than its own human rights obligations and the actual meaning of "European values”. As a result, the EU’s external border has become the world’s most lethal. According to some estimates, even as many as 36,000 people have lost their lives in attempting to reach Fortress Europe as a result of its restrictive policies since the early 1990s.³