Fortification of land border as an aspect of regional competition

The issue of frontiers inherited from the colonial era has never been dissociated from the question of Western Sahara in Algeria’s foreign policy towards Morocco. The Western Sahara issue has also been used, by Algeria, as a mean to force Morocco to make territorial concessions in the north of their land border. In the early years of independence, Algerian leaders were not interested in the territory of Western Sahara and expressed in various official meetings that they would support any agreement between Morocco and Mauritania to settle this issue. Houari Boumedienne, then Algerian president, announced in the seventh Arab summit in Rabat in 1974 that Algeria had no territorial demand in Western Sahara and was ready to help Morocco to recover its territory. On other occasions, he emphasized Algeria’s support for any solution that may be agreed upon by Morocco and Mauritania. Ferhat Abbas, head of the Algerian provisional (pre-independence) government in exile, pledged in writing to return to Morocco its land that had been annexed by France to Algeria during the colonial period (Sater, 2010: 120). Ferhat stated in his promise that “the Algerian provisional government recognizes that the problem of territories whose border was inequitably defined by France and will reach a solution through negotiation between the Moroccan and Algeria governments once Algeria gets its independence".

However, after gaining independence in 1962, the Algerian leaders changed their position on the common border and, later, on the Western Sahara question. The Algerian position is based on the principle of uti possidetis adopted by the Organization of African Unity. Morocco relies on its historical rights to the Western Sahara region and the disputed border with Algeria. But, as pointed out above, the real reason does not lie in competing interpretations of the principle of uti possidetis or the right of people to self-determination, but in the mutual fear of any territorial change that may favor the position of the rival.

Furthermore, Morocco did not recognize Mauritania as a state until 1969, nine years after it officially gained its independence in 1960. Morocco had considered Mauritania as an integral part of its historical “pre-colonial” territory.

This vision had raised Algeria’s fears of Morocco’s supposed domination in the region. The involvement of Algeria in the Western Sahara affair in favor of the separatist organization Polisario mainly due to the fear of the Moroccan ambition to revise the border inherited from the colonial age. Moktar Ould Daddah, Mauritania’s president from 1961 to 1978, wrote in his memoir:

I have been convinced that if the King of Morocco [Hassan II] had ratified the Rabat Agreement in 1973 or 1974, the President of Algeria would not have encouraged the creation of the Polisario movement as a retaliatory measure against Morocco and the 1963 Sand War would not have been waged.

The statement of former Algerian president. Chadli Bendjedid (1979-92), in his memoir on the Morocco-Mauritania agreement regarding Western Sahara confirms the assumption that Algeria’s attitudes towards the disputed territories both in Western Sahara and common land border reflect the competition for regional influence:

though Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement recognizing the need for decolonization in Sahara and the right of people to self-determination, they were secretly preparing to share the Western Sahara region. Hassan II (the former king of Morocco) and Mokhtar Ould Daddah (the former President of Mauritania) signed a secret agreement in 1974 whereby they share the Western Sahara territory, the north for Morocco and the south for Mauritania. And they met again in Rabat to delineate the border between the two countries and then they signed a mutual defense pact.

Bendjedid argued:

we felt in Algeria that this is directed against us. The considerations of each country were clear. While Hassan II sought to isolate Mauritania from Algeria and convince the international community that the Western Sahara dispute is over, Ould Daddah wanted to put an end to the ambition of Morocco in the territory of his country by drawing new borders with Morocco.

(An extract from Chadli Bendjedid’s memoir in Arabic)

It has been proved many times that the main concern of Algeria is to prevent Morocco from strengthening its geopolitical power and reintegrating Western Sahara into the Moroccan territory. The most important point according to the approach used in this chapter is that Algeria has tried by different means to prevent the reintegration of Western Sahara to Morocco because such scenario is seen by Algeria as a further geopolitical advantage for Morocco over other Maghrebi countries mainly Algeria. Furthermore, the Moroccan delay in the ratification of the 1972 border agreement has increased Algeria’s fear of Moroccan regional

The case of Morocco and Algeria 113 ambitions. There are still a few Moroccan politicians and academics who call for the revision of this agreement and recovery of the Eastern Sahara, which is under the sovereignty of the post-colonial Algeria, to Morocco. Morocco’s ambition to strengthen its regional influence during the early years of independence prompted Algeria to use the Western Sahara issue to rein in Moroccan regional ambition and implicate it in this long and costly conflict. Therefore, the increased fortification of the borders on both sides can be seen as a continuation of competition between the two countries by other means.