The bordering regime as socio-cultural norming and division
Directly after Fidesz’s spectacular electoral victory in April 2010, the proclamation of a so-called National Cooperation System (....) indicated that an epochal political as well as cultural shift was underway (Batory, 2016; Kovacs and
Trencsenyi, 2019). From the official English language version of the text, we can read that:
They have authorized more than mere adjustment or change; they have authorized us, through the strength of national cooperation, to establish a new political, economic, and social system built on new rules in every area of life.
(Office of the National Assembly 2010)
In other words, a historical moment of fundamental transformation was declared (Pataki. 2013). According to this narrative, while the socialist system as such was swept aside in 1989, only partial sovereignty was achieved until this grand victory. Sentiments of discrimination, the demonization of "unhungarian” transition phase governments, as well as domestic malaise due to economic crisis were successfully mobilized in order to recode the post-socialist experience as an incomplete process of national becoming. Since 2010, the Fidesz has sought, both as a means to power and in an effort to subsequently consolidate its hold on society, to infuse its political identity with a sense of epochal change driven by popular will, finally putting an end to indecisive government pandering to external interests (Palonen, 2018). What we find is a comprehensive attempt to reorder Hungarian society along autocratic and populist principles, creating an “illiberal alternative” that reflects a deep social conservatism. This was facilitated by the revolutionary thrust of Orban's agenda after 2002 which employed increasingly radicalized notions of national identity and interest. Moreover, this radicalization was not limited to political discourses, it impacted the public sphere and public spaces as a whole (e.g., media, arts and sciences, education, urban development goals, politics of historical memory). Most significantly, this radicalization process involved organizing, mobilizing and instrumentalizing a conservative-patriotic civil society movement that includes the Polgari Korok (Citizens’ circles) and the recently created Polgarok a Varosert Egyesulet (Association of Citizens for the City) (HVG, 2019).
Hostility towards liberal social values already tangible during Orban’s first government (1998-2002) have evolved into a pointed contestation of core principles that govern EU membership, including the rule of law and freedom of the press (Financial Times, 2017). Orban has thus portrayed Hungary as a center of new European ideas that more closely adhere to public sentiment. This de-centered interpretation of Europe, has been developed in the media via depictions of Hungary as an innovator and an active, rather than passive, member of the EU, supporting a nationally defined Christian Europe and unmasking Brussel’s “political correctness” (Szarka, 2017). Accordingly, the present Hungarian government has warned constantly of the dangers of “unnatural migration” and the emergence of parallel (i.e., Islamic) societies that will threaten Europe’s welfare, security and identity. In mobilising support for restrictive asylum policies and unilateral border closures, Hungary’s prime minister has proclaimed that “illiberal” values are needed in order to protect national societies and guard against “naive” understandings of openness and tolerance.
Hungary’s use of borders is therefore complemented by biopolitical instruments of internal control that attempt to reduce the visibility of that which can be categorized as the “non-Hungarian”. This has taken shape, for example, in attempts to visually “cleanse” areas of Budapest that are of a mixed ethnic (e.g., largely Roma) character and thus reintegrating them into a hegemonic story of mainstream Hungarianness (Keresztely et al., 2017). Moreover, migrants and refugees are only visible in the state-dominated media (most major newspapers and national news channels) to the extent they can be identified as an existential physical, economic or cultural threat (see Meszaros, 2019).
Hungary’s government also refuses to align with the EU’s position on humanitarian aid. On the contrary, the official Hungarian standpoint is that the prevention of human trafficking is the true humanitarian issue at stake. In this way, the present Hungarian government focuses single-mindedly on border protection and shielding society from direct contact with asylum seekers. This message is accompanied by increasing hostility towards civil society organizations that promote humanitarian solutions, for example those associated with George Soros and his Open Society Foundations? Referring to the migrant crisis, Orban has decried
- (...) an absurd coalition which had emerged between people smugglers, dictators pursuing flawed policies in their own countries and Western European civil human rights organizations and NGOs (...) Hungarians, working against our own national interests, also play a prominent role in enabling the operation of such networks in this region.
- (Hungarian government, 2016a)
Hungary’s open animosity towards German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s welcome culture idea proclaimed in 2015 is another indication of the conflation of national conservativism and securitized thinking. In this context, humanitarian aims of accommodating refugees are marginalized by the political framing of refugee mobility in terms of socio-ethnic and religious tensions as well as increased social burdens for strapped public budgets. On the other hand, the Hungarian government has also formulated direct messages against multiculturalism more generally in which crime, terrorism and insecurity are openly associated not only with refugees but also irregular migrants (Barlai and Sik, 2017). This discourse is supported by constant negative Hungarian media coverage of Europe’s refugee crisis and conspiracy theories that suggest an “externally” driven exploitation of Europe’s open societies. In Orban’s own words, “all terrorists are migrants” (Kaminski, 2015).
Accordingly, the bordering regime represents an attempt to tap into European conservative scepticism of multiculturalism and open borders, as well as to consolidate domestic political power by appropriating critical debates on security and creating a hegemonic narrative of "national interest". Having regained political autonomy in 1989, conservative forces in Hungary provocatively argue that the country is loath to subject itself to the dictates of another multinational "empire”. The present Hungarian government thus seeks to change the rules by which questions of migration and citizenship are discussed and dealt with politically by advancing national understandings of political community. Consequently, domestic political views that conflict with the government’s interpretations of what constitutes “Hungarianness” (political legacies, historical memory) have been marginalized in the public sphere and in some cases have faced ostracism (public shaming as non-national liberals). Targets of this are: Roma communities, liberal political thinkers, civil society activists, social scientists and in general groups that through their ideas, physical appearance and lack of sympathy for the government can be identified as undesirable. Within this context, George Soros and NGOs who receive support from his Open Society Foundation have been accused of plotting to undermine Hungarian sovereignty and democracy by facilitating the entry of large numbers of would-be migrants.4 The 2017 national campaign against the "Soros-Plan” not only played with latent anti-Semitic tropes but more generally mobilized xenophobia and fear in anticipation of the April 2018 parliamentary elections.
