Specific correlations

The concern of this chapter, then, is with establishing, and also refining, the correlation of creativity utterly lacking with computability, by a progressively developed argument. We will focus on how each of the clauses contributes to the gestalt sense of correspondence and on the specific verbal and conceptual correlations between ‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, pp. 362-363) and an automatic mechanical procedure or algorithm.

So mechanical or routine

The opening clause of the delineation of creativity utterly lacking in the opinion, ‘so mechanical or routine’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362), is consistent with the gestalt effect of correspondence with computability. It also contains a specifically correlating element, ‘so mechanical’ (p. 362), and a partially differentiating element, ‘so ... routine’ (p. 362).

So mechanical

‘[S]o mechanical’ is the first element of the clause and is then the dominant characterization of processes without any creativity. It can be correlated with a mechanical procedure (see Box 5.2 on mechanical procedure) through specific similarities.

Box 5.2 Mechanical procedure

Mechanical procedure is a classic term for an automatic computational process.

The computational process was classically characterized in mechanical terms. The concept and term mechanical procedure emerged from a model of a human computer acting mechanically.

We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is only capable of a finite number of conditions.

(Turing, 1936-1937/2004, p. 117 [emphasis added])

A mechanical procedure then corresponds to a computational process and includes a human acting mechanically or as a machine.

Classically, and in its origins, the modeling of the computational process in mechanical terms was concerned with automatic procedures: ‘If at each stage the motion of a machine ... is completely determined by the configuration, we shall call the machine an ‘automatic machine’. ... In this paper I deal only with automatic machines’ (Turing, 1936-1937/2004, p. 118). In subsequent discussions, the deliberate limitation to automatic machines has been transformed into a primary focus. An automatic mechanical procedure has been widely regarded as the purest or most intense form of a computational process or a mechanical procedure from many perspectives, including discussions of computability (Turing, 1936-1937; Gbdel, 1964/ 2004) and other disciplines, including classical experimental information retrieval and natural language processing (Wilks, Slator, & Guthrie, 1996). Mechanical procedure then refers primarily or exclusively to automatic computational processes, with automatic as the strongest or most intense form, and is a type of process.

The model of the computational process with which the term mechanical procedure is associated was intended to encompass preexisting terms and concepts, including algorithm, but to give them a more precise and materially definite form. The scope of the computational processes covered by mechanical procedure, algorithm, and effective procedure can be considered coterminous, for the analytical purposes here.

We will use mechanical procedure here as the preferred, although the not necessarily the exclusive, term, for its classical origins, precise description, and the direct verbal connection it offers with the opinion.

The most striking and immediate similarity subsists at the level of expression. ‘[M]echanicaT in ‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) is the identical verbal form to mechanical in mechanical procedure, if both occurrences are considered as sequences of characters from the given alphabet and written language. In formal logic, a good notation or symbolism can reveal relations between ideas, as Wittgenstein noted.

Now we understand our feeling that we are in possession of the right logical conception, if only all is right in our symbolism.

(Wittgenstein, 1922/1981, §4.1213)

In this instance, the identity in expression is a similarity in itself and a compelling suggestion of further similarities.

The common alphabet and language for mechanical are indicative of the contexts of use from which the term is derived. Mechanical in the opinion is not marked as a technical or specialized term by its alphabet or language nor by citation and is best understood as taken from ordinary discourse. Similarly, mechanical in mechanical procedure was derived from ordinary English language discourse. Although logical and mathematical notation was subsequently used in making more precise the concept of acting as a machine, the ordinary discourse term is still retained. Both occurrences of mechanical are then derived from a relatively common context of use in ordinary discourse.

The common derivation from ordinary discourse has implications for the meaning of mechanical adopted by the opinion and for a mechanical procedure. Classically, it was asserted that ‘[f]or a large class of cases - although not for all -in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (Wittgenstein, 1953/1968, §43). The relative commonality of the ordinary discourse context for derivation, ‘the use in the language’, then implies some commonality in the meaning adopted. The context for derivation further implies that the ordinary discourse meaning was adopted both by the opinion and for a mechanical procedure.

The question then arises of whether the ordinary discourse meaning of mechanical adopted is retained. For its occurrence in the opinion, no departure from its ordinary discourse meaning can be found. For a mechanical procedure, the history of the development of the concept indicates that the ordinary discourse meaning of mechanical has been retained as an essential basis while precision has been added to the idea of acting as a machine (Herken, 1994). The ordinary discourse meaning of mechanical must then be understood as fully retained, for both occurrences.

The meaning of mechanical in ordinary discourse includes both a human acting mechanically and the operations of a machine. For the opinion, this dual application of mechanical can be supported by reference to a definition taken from a culturally and chronologically proximate monolingual dictionary, ‘done as if by machine’ (Webster, 1981), where the qualification ‘as if’, can be read to indicate the inclusion of direct human activity. The concept of a mechanical procedure, from its preliminary scientific definition, similarly embraces both a human acting mechanically and the operations of a machine such as a computer. The different uses of the term, mechanical, then both have a comparable dual application.

The idea of acting mechanically implies an activity or process and this implication is realized in the opinion and for a mechanical procedure. ‘[S]o mechanical’ in the opinion is contained within a paragraph introduced as concerned with ‘selected, coordinated, or arranged’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) where the verb form indicates reference to an activity or process. It also, and more immediately, characterizes the ‘selection and arrangement of facts’, which also can be read to invoke processes (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991). Procedure in mechanical procedure similarly refers to a type of process, from its definition. ‘[S]o mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) in the opinion and in a mechanical procedure, then, have a further similarity in their reference to a process.

Processes are invoked by denotation. ‘[S]o mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) in the opinion directly characterizes or denotes, rather than indirectly connotes, a type of process. A mechanical procedure also directly describes or denotes a process. Denotation is usually considered a stronger and more primary form than is connotation (Barthes, 1953/1984, pp. 149-150; Eco, 1976, pp. 55-86). The strength of the connection to the processes invoked is then conveyed by denotation, for both the opinion and for a mechanical procedure. The common use of denotation also constitutes a significant similarity between ‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) in the opinion and mechanical in a ‘mechanical procedure’.

The most intense sense of mechanical is at issue in the opinion and for a mechanical procedure. ‘[S]o’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) in ‘so mechanical or routine’ (p. 362) directly qualifies mechanical and indicates that it is to be understood in its most intense sense. Mechanical in a ‘mechanical procedure’ is understood in an absolute sense, as matter of preliminary scientific definition, and this is occasionally marked by the additional term automatic in ‘automatic mechanical procedure’. A similarity in intensity of meaning then has been established.

‘[S]o mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) is directly linked to the antithesis to creativity, ‘no creativity whatsoever’ (p. 362), which semantically encompasses both the extreme antithesis to creativity, ‘nothing remotely creative’ (p. 363), and its subsequent, less intense, complement, ‘insufficient creativity’ (p. 363). As the first and dominant term of‘so mechanical or routine’ (p. 362), ‘so mechanical’ can be correlated with the extreme antithesis to creativity. A significant element directly correlated with computability is then linked to the extreme antithesis to creativity.

In summary, ‘so mechanical’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) and an automatic mechanical procedure can be highly correlated with each other. They have an identity in their expression and strong similarities in the derivation of mechanical from ordinary discourse, the adoption and retention of its ordinary discourse meaning, the inclusion of directly human and of machine activity, the invocation of a process, and the use of denotation. The most intense sense of mechanical is at issue in the opinion and for a mechanical procedure. The identity and similarities approach exhaustivity in their inclusion of aspects of possible resemblance which could be considered significant for correlation. ‘[S]o mechanical’ (p. 362) in the opinion then can be definitively correlated with an automatic mechanical procedure. It can be linked to the extreme antithesis to creativity. The correlation of ‘so mechanical’ (p. 352) with an automatic mechanical procedure can be regarded as proven beyond reasonable doubt.

So...routine

‘[S]o ... routine’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p.

362) in ‘so mechanical or routine’ (p. 362) can be considered in itself. Routine could be understood in its ordinary discourse sense, capable of qualifying both process and product, and as semantically distinct from, but not in tension, with ‘so mechanical’ (p. 362).

So mechanical or routine

We can now return to considering the clause ‘so mechanical or routine’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) as a whole, after having considered its significant constituent elements.

‘[S]o mechanical or routine’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 362) is directly linked to an antithesis to creativity, ‘no creativity whatsoever’ (p. 362). ‘[N]o creativity whatsoever’ (p. 362) semantically includes both the extreme antithesis to creativity, ‘nothing remotely creative’ (p. 363), and its less intense complement, ‘insufficient creativity’ (p. 363). ‘[S]o mechanical or routine’ (p. 362) thereby encompasses all levels of antithesis to creativity.