Summary of argument as logical statements
f copyright «-> originality
Original «-> ((at least some minimal degree of creativity) A (independently created))
A minimal degree of creativity —► creativity
A minimal degree of creativity' <-> ~ (creative spark ... utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent)
creative spark so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent creativity —► creativity'
(creative spark utterly lacking) <-> ~ creativity
~ (A compilation has the slightest trace of creativity) «-> ((so mechanical V so ... routine) A (entirely typical V garden-variety))
(so mechanical V routine) ~ computability
mechanical (so mechanical) = mechanical (automatic mechanical procedure)
so mechanical = automatic mechanical procedure
~ (A compilation has the slightest trace of creativity) <-> ((automatic mechanical procedure V so ... routine) A (entirely typical V garden-variety))
(A compilation has the slightest trace of creativity) <-> ~ ((automatic mechanical procedure V so ... routine) A (entirely typical V garden-variety))
Creativity «-> ~ ((automatic mechanical procedure V so ... routine) A (entirely typical v garden-variety) )
(A minimal degree of creativity V creative spark so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent creativity) —► creativity
A minimal degree of creativity <-> - (creative spark ... utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent)
((at least some minimal degree of creativity) A (independently created)) <-> Original
h copyright <-> originality.
Conclusion
The resolution of the issues raised by critiques, the revelation of the particular form of self-consistency of the judgment, and the further desirable qualities of the reading render it strongly proven and a basis for future judicial practice
The judgment, then, rather than being a radical misconstrual of copyright, emerges as extraordinarily far-sighted in its intentions and effects. The social benefits which can flow from the diffusion of technologies are also implicitly recognized, by removing a restriction on the development of particular technologies.
The need for the Supreme Court to revisit the judgment or for Congress to pass correcting legislation is greatly diminished. Judicial and legislative deliberation has opportunity costs, in diminishing the attention available for other purposes, and may only occur when anomalies between the operations and intended purpose of copyright are recognized, considered to be harmful, and perceived to be acute. Constitutionally, Congress, as the legislature, cannot override the Supreme Court and would have to pass sui generis type legislation, which would itself be questionable. The value of the interpretation here lies in the economy of its effects, reducing the need for further judicial or legislative deliberation, avoiding special provisions, resolving contradictions within the judgment, and integrating it with the historical development and synchronic scope for copyright, including establishing common criteria for property in databases and other writings.
In terms of a narrative motif, critiques of the judgment can be understood as the suitors, or false critics, whom Odysseus defeats on his return to Ithaca. We can dismiss the suitors, or false critics, and restore copyright to the deeply founded bed on which it rests and on which it can be renewed.
Resolving the issues raised by critiques, revealing the particular form of selfconsistency of the judgment, substantiating creativity, and other desirable qualities, render the reading strongly proven and a strong basis for future judicial practice.
References
Feist (1991). Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Holmes, O.W. (1881/1991). The common law. With a new introduction by Sheldon M. Novick. New York: Dover.
