Age-old practice...time-honored tradition

The sequence of clauses, from ‘age-old practice’ to ‘time-honored tradition’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 363), constitutes the most connected and extensive delineation of creativity utterly lacking in the opinion. The group of terms as a whole has a historical resonance, although the particular term history is not used. The characterization of the process of alphabetical arrangement in the opinion in historical terms can be correlated with the understanding of computability in terms of the natural, with what ‘would naturally be regarded as computable’ (Turing, 1936-1937/1993, p. 249) (see also Box 5.3 on computability and the natural), through a number of similarities.

Box 5.3 Computability and the natural

Conceptions of computability have repeatedly and consistently appealed to the natural.

Turing’s (1936-1937/2004) own formulation of the concept of computability as what ‘would naturally be regarded as computable’ (p. 135) [emphasis added] drew on preceding thought in mathematics and mathematical logic and also was rooted in ordinary discourse and everyday experience. This characterization of computability has been accepted in subsequent logical and mathematical discourse and theoretical computer science. Natural[ly] is the specific and the dominant term.

Other terms for the concept of computability, analogous to the natural or even descending or derived from it, include particularly ‘intuitive’ (Boolos and Jeffrey, 1989, p. 20; Church, 1936/2004, p. 90; Davis, 1982, p. 10: Davis, 1994, p. 154; Minsky, 1967, p. 136; Rosen, 1994, p. 524; Turing, 1939/2004, p. 160) and ‘appeals to intuition’ (Turing, 1936-1937/ 2004, p. 135).

Conceptions of computability are, then, characterized as natural, with some further incorporation of the intuitive, and these characterizations are widely diffused within relevant scholarly spheres.

The primary similarity lies directly in meaning. The constituent substantive terms of the passage in the opinion - ‘an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course ... practically inevitable ... time-honored tradition’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 363) - indicate long duration and transcendence of particular historical periods, approaching the natural. One clause, ‘practically inevitable’ (p. 363), reveals the historical terminologically converging with the natural. Computability has been consistently conceived in terms of the natural, with what would naturally be regarded as computable. The terms in the opinion and the natural in conceptions of computability are then similar to each other in their meaning.

The historical in the opinion and the natural in the concept of computability both invoke a set of processes conceived as objects for characterization. That a set of processes is at issue in the opinion is indicated by the gerund, or noun form of the verb, ‘arranging’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 363). The natural in the concept of computability also is concerned with sets of processes conceived as objects for characterization. The common invocation of sets of processes conceived as objects for characterization constitutes a further similarity.

The mode of characterization of processes is indirect with elements of connotation. The historical reference and resonance of the clauses in the opinion function as an indirect description of processes. The conception of computability as natural which preexisted the formulation of satisfactory models of the computational process could be regarded as a concept or an indirect description awaiting an object which fully corresponded to the conception. With the formulation and publication of models of the computational process, and their acceptance as absolute definitions, conceptions of computability as natural have tended to be reduced to connotations of a primary and more clearly articulated denotation. Both the clauses in the opinion and the natural in computability are, then, similar in functioning as indirect descriptions of processes, approaching connotation rather than denotation.

A contrast in meaning also emerges directly between the historical resonance implied by the extensive chronological reference and references to ‘tradition’ in the opinion (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 1991, p. 363) and the natural explicit in conceptions of computability. The contrast runs counter to the similarity established and could disturb the correlation being developed.

The contrast’s potential significance for disturbing the correlation can be reduced. The apparent sharpness of the difference immediately conveyed by the opposition of the historical to the natural is mollified when the long duration involved in the constituent terms of the opinion resonating with the historical is recalled. The independent status of the contrast is lessened by noting that the particular opposed elements are rooted in the underlying disciplinary bases from which different perspectives emerge. Law would have a humanistic and historical basis (Holmes, 1881/1991), corresponding to the historical resonance and reference of the terms in the opinion. Naturally regarded, and in its supporting role, intuitive, are resonant of a Platonist conception of mathematics, reflecting the disciplines from which the articulated concept of computability emerged. The disruptive potential of the contrast in meaning has then been reduced, by indicating its lack of sharpness and of independent status. A residual contrast between the historical and the natural remains.

In summary, then, the characterization of the antithesis to creativity in historical terms in the opinion can be correlated with the concept of computability, through a similarity in meaning, the common invocation of processes conceived as objects for characterization, and the indirect, approaching connotative rather than denotative, characterization of sets of processes. A contrast in meaning also emerged, between the historical and the natural. The extensive similarities constitute a strong correlation between the most extensive delineation of the extreme antithesis to creativity in the opinion and the concept of computability.

The clauses with a historical resonance which have been correlated with computability as natural characterize the extreme antithesis to creativity, ‘nothing remotely creative’ (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 1991, p. 363). They are also semantically reminiscent of‘so ... routine’ (p. 362) and were mediated to the mechanical by the routine. The elements connected with computability, are, then linked to the extreme antithesis to creativity and to the routine mediating to the mechanical.