Who is susceptible to fake news?
The illusory truth effect is widespread and can be seen in the impact of adverts, political propaganda, social media, etc. Vosoughi, Deb, and Aral (2018) found that falsehoods (fake news) in social media travel faster and get repeated more than political assertions that are factual. Misinformation can thereby get solidified into conspiracy theories depending on the individual’s cognitions. It is even possible to predict that a person will believe a particular conspiracy theory if they already believe in another one. Conspiratorial thinking seems to lead to a correlation between beliefs in one conspiracy (such as: NASA faked the moon landing) and can lead people to a rejection of climate science or that HIV causes AIDS or a belief that vaccinations cause autism (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013). For example. Rush Limbaugh, a right-wing American talk show host, has espoused a number of conspiracy theories on CFCs and the ozone layer, Obama’s birthplace, blaming Obama for bringing Ebola to the USA, etc. He has since created a new conspiracy theory that coronavirus was the common cold and an antiTrump conspiracy.
Along with political leaning, there appears to be a further correlation between this kind of thinking and authoritarian attitudes, low empathy, closed-mindedness (not being open to new experiences), and being male (bear in mind these are correlations and not deterministic. Fortunately, being male doesn't automatically make you a flat-earther). These findings can be explained to some extent by a phenomenon known as social dominance orientation (SDO). SDO is a psychological preference for hierarchical social structures (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Thus, people who score highly in SDO espouse ideologies that assume there is an inherent and inevitable inequality among social groups; hence, a belief in capitalism, meritocracy, and a tendency to racism and sexism. It is negatively correlated with empathy, tolerance, and altruism. Low scores suggest a view that resists categorizing people and is more egalitarian. Thus, according to Pratto et al. (1994, p. 741), there are ‘two varieties of legitimizing myths: hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, which promote greater degrees of social inequality, and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths, which promote greater social equality’.
People can also be divided in their opinions due to cognitive style. One can make a judgement on a topic such as vaccination based on the degree to which one is willing to engage in analytic thinking. A reduced Actively Open minded Thinking (AOT) would be an example of dysrationalia. Lewandowsky and Oberauer (2016) included a preference for sticking with simplifying heuristics rather than analyzing complex issues as one of the reasons behind the motivated rejection of science along with biased risk assessment and adopting a ‘conspiracist ideation'. Hence South African president Thabo Mbeki did not believe that HIV and AIDS are related leading to his refusal to allow drugs to treat the disease regarding them as ‘poisons’. Between 343,000 and 365,000 are estimated to have died as a result of his policies and relying on treatments using herbal remedies.
Other researchers have shown that a variety of personality types are more disposed to conspiracy theories and fake news than others. Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, and Cannon (2018) recruited over 900 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and presented them with 12 false and 12 real news stories. They also conducted a series of measures using a number of inventories such as the Peters et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI; Peters, Joseph, Day, & Garety, 2004); cognitive style measured via the AOT scale (Stanovich & West, 2007); the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005); the DOG scale measuring dogmatism (Altemeyer, 2002); and the Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). As for their findings, the title of their paper sums them up quite neatly: ‘Belief in Fake News is Associated with Delusionality, Dogmatism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Reduced Analytic Thinking’.
Much of the research on the motivated rejection of science has been conducted in the US due to the cultural divide between liberals and conservatives (Democrats and Republicans) that has already been discussed. For example, strong supporters of free-market economics are most likely to reject the science of climate change (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Kalian, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2009). Kahan et al. asked people for their views on nanotechnology, a topic that did not divide opinion amongst the respondents due to its relative unfamiliarity. However, when they presented information about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology, liberals and conservatives were divided along their worldview with liberals being more risk averse and conservatives focussing on the economic benefits.
As we have seen, overcoming conspiracy theories or the motivated rejection of science is far from easy. Schmid and Betsch (2019) ran a number of experiments to find out what kind of strategy might mitigate the influence of science denial. They found that providing facts along with identifying and using the rhetorical techniques science denialists use can be effective. Finding ways to combat conspiracy theories and science rejection is of immense importance. Anti-vaxxers are beginning to cause epidemics of diseases we had thought almost eradicated. Denying climate science has a qualitatively different effect since climate change is likely to have a destructive impact on human civilization as well as causing mass extinctions unless it is taken seriously and dealt with urgently. With evidence of dysrationality. motivated ignorance, and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance rife among some very important and influential groups, Walter Quattrociocchi has suggested, echoing Asimov some 37 years later, that ‘the age we live in should be renamed from the Information Age to the Age of Credulity' (Quattrociocchi, 2017, p. 63).
Summary
There have been philosophical arguments about the nature of truth and what ‘facts’ are. However, assuming there is a verifiable state of affairs in the world, we can compare our beliefs and opinions to what we discover about the world to see how far they overlap. There are many reasons why someone may have beliefs about the world that do not correspond with reality. Some of these come under the general rubric of motivated cognition. When there is a disorder of belief formation and consistency, or a difficulty in assessing how to achieve one’s goals then there is evidence of dysrationalia.
An example of dysrationalia and motivated cognition is motivated ignorance where one deliberately avoids finding something out in case it conflicts with prior beliefs and prejudices. This can be ultimately damaging to an individual or to a society when a government is guilty of ignoring information (‘shooting the messenger').
By dint of repetition along with motivated reasoning, fake news can lead to conspiracy theories. Repetition is enough to allow an assertion to be believed even after information that the assertion was false. Mud sticks.
Belief in one conspiracy theory is predictive of belief in others and belief in conspiracies and fake news is correlated with political (generally conservative) ideology, dogmatism, and reduced analytic thinking. The consequences of some aspects of motivated cognition can be extremely serious.
Suggested Further Reading
Lewandowsky, S., Oberauer, K., & Gignac. G. E. (2013). Nasa faked the moon landing—therefore, (climate) science is a hoax: An anatomy of the motivated rejection of science [Article]. Psychological Science, 24(5), 622-633. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612457686.
Oreskes, N„ & Conway. E. M. (2010). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press.
Prooijen. J.-W. (2018). The psychology of conspiracy theories. London. UK: Routledge.
Scientific American (2017). Return to reason: The science of thought. Scientific American, 317(4). September 2017. New York, NY: SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, a Division of Springer Nature America, Inc.
