The ANC’s conceptual approach to foreign policy

The ratcheting up of anti-Western views in South African foreign policy under Zuma is a departure from the more nuanced Pan-Africanist perspective of the Thabo Mbeki years. Under Mbeki, the more populist voices within the governing party had been drowned. South Africa was set on a path that broadly converged with neo-liberal perspectives and international openness. Mbeki walked a tight rope. He did not pursue a neo-liberal order for its own sake, but worked within its constraints to project South Africa positively in international relations and carve a space of for North-South engagements in ways that would benefit the African continent. The New Economic Programme for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) set out Mbeki’s objectives in engaging with the world. Not so with Zuma who, in the course of his term, did not develop a sound ideational framework that would define South Africa’s external relations. Further, his foreign policy practices diverged from Mandela’s normative focus on human rights. Both leaders who preceded Zuma valued independence more than any narrow ideological alliances in international relations. At the same time, they were aware of South Africa’s burden of responsibility towards the African continent. Nonetheless, even though South Africa emphasised its “South” credentials and Pan-Africanist outlook especially under Mbeki, it still sought to position itself more as a bridge builder. This led to some characterising this posture as that of a middle-power (Nel, Taylor and van der Westhuizen, 2001).

Middle powers tend to be known for their neutrality in international affairs, blending the normative with pragmatic positions. Scholars such as Cooper (1997) regard middle powers as countries that are imbued with traits that condition them to act as “good international citizens” or multilateralists. This, of course, is not without its challenges in an international system characterised by the pursuit of

South Africa's foreign policy under Zuma 55 national interest to maximise relative power—or in the case of economic goals— to aggregate wealth.

During Zuma’s administration, there was a marked shift in South Africa’s foreign policy conduct away from these normative signifiers. What featured glaringly in Zuma’s foreign policy was its unhinged approach—at times decidedly anti-Western, at other times showing a lack of independence and confidence. It was apparent how South Africa’s interests increasingly came to be tied to those of China and Russia, especially during Zuma’s second term of office (2014-2018).

In the early years of South Africa’s democracy and when the country rejoined the international community after decades under isolation, the new South Africa forged deep relations with both the Western and the non-Western world. As part of its foreign pillars, South Africa acknowledged the importance of strengthening relations with the countries of the North. Promoting exports on a diversified basis, attracting foreign direct investment and benefitting from technology spillovers were some of the calculations for maintaining relations with Western countries. As such, the first ever-comprehensive bilateral trade agreement South Africa entered into post-1994 was with the European Union, supplemented by the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the European Union. The trade deal was signed in October 1999 after five years of intense negotiations.

On the multilateral front, South Africa was actively involved in both regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), as well as in international processes beyond the continent, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations. South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism also had its source within the pillars of the struggle propagated by the ANC in exile, especially normative commitments to international solidarity and the rights-based discourse (Alden & Le Pere, 2006). Under Zuma, South Africa had strained relations with its African partners.

Despite the unwritten rule that major countries in the continent. South Africa and Nigeria would not seek office in the African Union Commission, South Africa pushed for its own candidate—Nkosazana-Dlamini Zuma—in 2012. Dlamini-Zuma is a powerful South African politician who was once the country’s minister of foreign affairs and who is someone with presidential ambitions. Her campaign for the AU Commission was seen by some as divisive as it pitted the two powerhouses on the continent—South Africa and Nigeria—against each other. Ultimately, Dlamini-Zuma’s record at the helm of this body was a mixed one. Despite the fact that she spearheaded the launch of African Union’s Agenda 2063, she was mostly absent from the AU and very slow to react to crises such as those in Mali and the Sahel or the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

Dlamini-Zuma was certainly not the cause of these crises, while the complexity of politics at the AU, which give very little room for any head to bring in reforms, should be acknowledged. However, every leader that takes up the cudgels should appear able to bring forth their creativity, diplomatic skills and political acumen to effect noticeable institutional reform. There is no evidence to show that after her term she left a legacy of leaving a stronger and independent institution behind.

This was in part because South Africa in the first place did not have any strategic perspectives in bringing about reforms at the AU. As part of promoting Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy, there were no objectives or priorities articulated. If at all, these were to emerge as rationalisation after the fact.