Ethiopian and Middle Eastern Arab relations

Background and context

Ethiopia’s geography underscores the vitality of the physical link with the near Middle Eastern Arab and Muslim countries, in particular Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt. Following the First Hegira f the immigration of the persecuted followers of the Prophet from the Arabian Peninsula to Ethiopia in the 7th century AD, Islam established itself in the country. Welcomed by the kings of Ethiopia in AD 725, and consistent with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammed Ibn Ishaq, Muslims have peacefully co-existed with fellow Ethiopian Christians for the better part of 1,300 years. Ethiopia is the site for one of the most revered mosques in the world (the fourth after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem), located in the town of Negash, in the Tigray region. Demographically, 33.9% of Ethiopians are Muslims¹⁵ (Central Statistical Agency, 2010) who provide a bond for those abroad with whom they share similar cultural, religious and heritage links. This is a source of enduring people-to-people relations. Yet, the experiences of conscious long-standing interactions between Ethiopia and Middle Eastern Arab/Muslim countries finds expression in two major historical and contradictory narratives (Haggai. 1994. 2007, 2016; MFA, 2002).

The dominant narrative for the entire historical period is a positive discourse based on the Prophet’s edict of peaceful co-existence with Ethiopia, including prohibiting “Jihad” against Ethiopia (The Hadith, n. d.). A secondary narrative, dominant in history up to contemporary times, is often expressed by sections of “fundamentalist Muslims”. It portrays Ethiopia negatively as a bulwark against the spread of Islam or as antagonistic to Muslims in Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries. There were two major instances for this view. They include a period during the early 16th century when there was a jihadist campaign to convert Ethiopia to Islam. A similar episode happened in the second half of the 19th century when there were Ottoman Turks and Egyptian incursions into Northern Ethiopia and present-day Eritrea (Trimingham, 1952). Overall, however, historical interactions between Ethiopia and Middle Eastern Arabs can be characterised as mainly peaceful, promoting mutually beneficial trade and cultural links. Yet, despite only these brief interludes of mutual antagonism, both narratives have, nevertheless, come to shape Ethiopia’s strategic culture to the present-day.

Ethio-Egyptian relations

Ethio-Egyptian relations base themselves on historical and regional geo-politics, as well as hydro-politics. Bilateral relations revolve around competing for the strategic resource of water and the history of relations regarding ecclesiastical, political and military affairs. Given that the Nile is Egypt's only source of water, Egypt has its own special, existential fears on the issue of Ethiopia’s ability, for the purposes of economic development and poverty alleviation, to control and regulate the flow of the Abay (Blue Nile).

It was for more than a millennia-and-a-half until 1959 that the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church was administered by the Egyptian Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria when it secured its own independent Patriarch. Historical resentment abounds about the Egyptian Church’s meddling in Ethiopian domestic affairs during different points in time. This often pertained to the anointment of Ethiopian dynastic successions and power struggles between regional principalities. Egyptian intervention under Ottoman ruler Ismail Pasha in the latter part of the 19th century meant the occupation of a large swathe of territory in Northern Ethiopia, something which only ended with Ethiopian victories against Egypt in 1875 and 1876.¹⁶

Throughout the 20th century up to the present, Ethio-Egyptian relations have been conditioned by five conflicting factors:

i. Pan-African solidarity and the common objective ofpromoting decolonisation in Africa, as well as interactions based on shared religions, cultures and traditions.

ii. Pan-Arabism, in particular radical Nasserite Arab nationalism that appeared to threaten Ethiopia’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This became evident in the early 1960s by Egypt’s support for the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)¹⁷ and Somalia’s claim to the Ethiopian Somali region, the Ogaden. Included here is politico-religious hostility towards Ethiopia from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in particular.

iii. Ethiopia’s strategic alliance with the USA and Israel, and Egypt’s pro-USSR positioning during Haile Selassie’s rule in Ethiopia and Nasser’s in Egypt, and the subsequent reversal of this positioning when Mengistu and Sadat/ Mubarak assumed power in Ethiopia and Egypt respectively.

iv. Mutual fear and suspicion regarding the use and regulation of the Blue Nile. Egypt’s default position has been, if need be, to seek to destabilise, or even dismember Ethiopia. As such, Egypt supports opposition and secessionist nationalist forces in Ethiopia; issues veiled and unveiled military thr eats and has an active policy of preventing Ethiopia from acquiring technology and external development finance for the Nile basin (Tilahun, 1979; MFA, 2002; Mohammed. 2007; Kassu, 2012; Meles, 2017; Tesfaye, 2017).

v. Mutual interest to counter the threat of terrorism, in particular the ones originating from the Horn of Africa (al-Shabaab) and the Arabian Peninsula (al-Qaida).

Ethiopian and the Arabian Peninsula countries’ relations

Ethiopia’s relations with Arabian Peninsula countries, in particular Yemen and Saudi Arabia, have been characterised by geographical, historical, cultural and religious factors. Historical and cultural links date back to the advent of Islam. This has resulted in strongly shared cultures and traditions with Yemen in particular. Prior to the Ethiopian Revolution, tens of thousands of Yemenis resided in Ethiopia.

The three countries bordered the Red Sea prior to Eritrean independence in 1993 and had an interest in the strategically important Strait of Bab el-Mandab as well as the Gulf of Aden- Suez Canal trade route. The emperor cultivated cordial relations with Saudi kings, in particular King Faisal. As conservative states, both were firmly within the USA camp. This changed after 1977 when Ethiopia and Yemen both became allies of the USSR.

With the end of the Cold War, after 2000 in particular, the relations between Ethiopia and Arabian Peninsula countries experienced new geo-political developments and emerging economic cooperation ventures that included (Tesfaye, 2017):

i. Increasing investment and trade links between Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries and Ethiopia.

ii. The rise of militant Jihadist terrorism, in particular from al-Qaida, ISIS and al-Shabaab, and the need to form security alliances regionally and globally.

iii. The politicisation and spread of Wahhabism to the Horn of Africa sponsored by Saudi Arabia, including the political spillovers of schisms in Sunni Islam, in particular amongst Wahhabists, Salafists, Sufists and al-Ahbashists.

iv. The Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000 and the ensuing state of “no war no peace” between the regimes and its negative impact on domestic politics in Ethiopia and the stability of the Horn of Africa.

v. The Ethio-Somali War of 1977-1978, the ensuing civil war and regime failure in Somalia and its destabilising impact on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

vi. The Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry, including over the control of the Red Sea and its geo-political impact on Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen.