SADC’s key policies on gender
The increasing interface between state and non-state actors pursuing gender security within the SADC’s policy structures can be summed up in a three-phase process between the 1990s to 2015. This process culminated in the development of SADC’s three key policies addressing gender security?
The first policymaking phase resulted in the first regional policy on gender, the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. This collective policy of 1997 sought to contribute to improved security through fostering closer regional cooperation and action among state and non-state actors in achieving gender equality (SADC Declaration on Gender, 1997). Through this collective gender policy, the SADC in its external relations with member states committed to establishing regional advisory structures with governments and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to monitor gender-related concerns across the region, as well as to establish a Gender Unit within its Secretariat (SADC Declaration on Gender, 1997). In 1998, an Addendum was crafted to address violence against women and children, and this formed a key feature of the 1997 Declaration (SADC Addendum, 1998). Particularly, Article 26 of the Addendum pointed to the critical need of urgently putting in place a legally binding SADC gender instrument on "Preventing Violence Against Women and Children” (SADC Addendum, 1998).
The second phase can be traced from 2003, when gender and women-focused civil society groupings were invited to the Botswana-based SADC Secretariat to participate in the review process of the 1997 Declaration and its 1998 Addendum.
The coming together of civil society actors and regional governments led to the development and adoption of the SADC’s first legally binding gender policy, the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development of 2008 (Roadmap to Equality Report, 2009: 12-13). The 2008 Gender Protocol sought to integrate gender in all SADC’s region-building structures, actions and policies (SADC Protocol on Gender, 2008). The 2008 Gender Protocol provided for steps to increase gender security through the empowerment of women, the elimination of all forms of discrimination in order to achieve gender equality, and to diffuse its content into legislation, programmes and projects, particularly at the national level (SADC Protocol on Gender, 2008).
The evolving SADC policies on gender point to their link to global, regional and local policies. SADC’s 2008 Gender Protocol was further aligned to the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 1979, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000, including its targets and timeframes up to 2015. As the expiration date of the MDGs approached in 2015, and in what would constitute the third phase, regional gender and women-focused civil society groups began to push for a review of the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development to be in line with the changing global, continental and regional norms (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2016: 14).
SADC’s Post-2015 Protocol on Gender and Development was a successor to the 2008 policy discussed above. The Post-2015 gender policy was shaped by global and continental norms such as the 2015-2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Beijing Plus 20 of 2015, the African Union’s Agenda 2063, as well as by the SADC’s twenty-seven protocols (SADC Protocol Barometer, 2016: 14). The evolving regional gender policy in Southern Africa reveal their strong link to global, regional and sub-regional norms. As noted by Acharya, norms have "multiple sources and contexts” (2013: 466). The Post-2015 policy embraced the values and language of the SDGs with the motif "Leaving No One Behind”. This includes the inclusion of often neglected issues and/or communities, such as men in the conversations on women and gender issues, and those advanced by the transnational queer movement on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights.4 The actions of gender and women-focused civil society groups who work closely with the SADC Secretariat and states at multiple levels to produce policies to push for their diffusion at a regional and at local levels, point to non-state agency in addressing gendered insecurities in the intra-national, international and transnational relations of the sub-region.
The opening up of democratic spaces characterised by growing non-state actor participation in politics has been perceived as a security threat by some SADC member-states. Owing to the thesis of declining state capacity, and in turn, the promotion of non-state actors in governance and democratic issues, the 1990s were characterised by the channelling of resources by donors directly to NGOs. NGO activities were in turn perceived as donor-funded, thereby regarded as a national security threat by some SADC member states such as
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana and Swaziland (CCR, 2013: 17). Mbuende (2012: 56) relates that:
There has been apprehension among SADC governments about foreign-funded NGOs in a number of countries. NGOs are seen either as pursuing a foreign agenda or as opposition in disguise. One of the liveliest debates that I witnessed at SADC summits was when the Secretariat tabled a report on SADC cooperation with NGOs. Most of the heads of state who participated in the meeting expressed apprehension about the role of NGOs.
According to Landsberg (2012: 12), the SADC to some degree practices its own exclusive forms of region-building in that it mostly interacts with its preferred non-state actors in line with its own interests that nonetheless overlook or neutralise others. For example, while NGOs running shelter programmes in Botswana have received financial support from the government, those with a human rights focus have faced challenges accessing such funding. Further, the human rights case between Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v the Republic of Zimbabwe over the seizure of land as part of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme without compensation brought to light the manner in which non-state actors are neutralised when they challenge state interests. Despite the fact that the SADC Tribunal in 2012 ruled in favour of the individual applicant (Campbell), the Zimbabwean government disregarded this ruling (Ndlovu, 2011). Article 16 of the SADC Treaty provides for the constitution of the SADC Tribunal to ensure the adherence to, and proper interpretation of, SADC's legal instruments (SADC. 1992). Yet, the 2012 ruling that reflects the scaling up of human rights protection did not receive any support. Member states, including a democratic South Africa and SADC as a whole, buckled to a rearguard action fought by the Zimbabwean Mugabe-led state. As a result, the SADC’s Summit decision simply suspended the Tribunal (former President Jacob Zuma's government decision to support this action was subsequently overruled by South Africa’s Constitutional Court in 2018).
Notwithstanding such an anomaly, the impressive growth of regional policies by SADC in Southern Africa points to a softening of the region’s gendered structures. While the implementation of policies on gender in the SADC’s external relations with member states has been key in promoting gender security, having some African governments positively respond has been lamentably slow. While there exists an active network of non-state actors interfacing with regional governments, there is, overall, however, still a lack of clarity “on the modalities for civil society participation in SADC’s activities" (CCR, 2013: 16). While the SADC recognises non-state actors as vital partners in community building, there is also a persisting degree of marginalisation of non-state actors in its policymaking spaces. Since 2016, nationalistic tendencies in terms of state to non-state relations within the SADC’s policymaking structures began to re-surface. The fall back into narrow nationalism points to retrogressive changes: to roll back non-state participation within SADC’s policymaking structures developed since the 1990s,
SADC—Non-state actors and region building 223 rooted in a collective agenda, particularly in the area of gender (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017: 335). If left unchecked, these tendencies potentially spell greater insecurity across Southern Africa and curtail the organisation of SADC in its external relations role on seeing to the implementation of regional policy by member states.
Seemingly in an effort to neutralise "these developments” to mean parochial nationalistic ones, counter-measures were devised. A process towards re-engagement with civil society by the SADC Secretariat was commissioned in 2016 (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017: 335). The re-engagement process seeks to consult widely with various stakeholders within, and outside. Southern Africa in order to develop a legal framework agreement to guide non-state participation within the SADC’s policy structures (SADC Gender Protocol Barometer, 2017: 335). The need for clear modalities for non-state participation within inter-governmental structures is stressed in civil society research reports and academic discourse. The legal framework formulated is necessary and, as it relates to strengthening non-state relations between the SADC Secretariat and member states, is a potential game-changer. Mbuende (2012: 57) notes:
There is no doubt that various non-state actors can add value to the process of regional integration in Southern Africa. It is important to underscore the differential roles of NGOs and governments. NGOs cannot substitute for governments even in areas where government institutions are weak. The challenge is to work towards strengthening such institutions. There are functions that can be carried out effectively by civil society, while others remain the preserve of the state. What is of cardinal importance, however, is to design appropriate mechanisms to institutionalise the involvement of non-state actors in the process of regional integration. Thus far, this involvement has been sporadic and unpredictable.
While SADC policy frameworks accommodate non-state engagement within its broader region-building agenda, in reality, African agency can only be strengthened within regional spaces if there are institutionalised or set-down modalities for non-state-state interactions (CCR, 2013: 16).
