Botswana’s foreign policy: Principled pragmatism in practice

Posture towards white minority rule

Following independence from Britain in 1966, Botswana was a small, landlocked state surrounded by white minority rule.⁷ It had a small population and vulnerable borders due to the lack of a professional armed force. The economy was heavily underdeveloped⁸ and almost wholly reliant on South Africa for long term subsistence through the labour market, the South African Customs Union (SACU) for access to trade opportunities and a common monetary policy determined by Pretoria (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 426; Black et al., 1988: 64-66). Notwithstanding these constraints, Gaborone carried out a pragmatically prudent, albeit principled foreign policy that incorporated defiance towards Pretoria, while still avoiding overtly provocative actions that would give South Africa and Rhodesia a pretext to respond coercively.⁹ As Gvalia et al. (2013) hold, elite identities and ideas shape foreign policy perceptions. As such, it is necessary to analyse the founding president, Seretse Khama’s views.

Khama had long been determined to wage a struggle against racial discrimination in the region. In 1948, he married Ruth Williams (a British Caucasian), occasioning remonstrations from the South African government, which had banned interracial marriages under its apartheid system.¹⁰ This ultimately led to Khama’s exile from Bechuanaland to Britain in the early 1950s (Henderson, 1990: 30). He garnered popular support amongst the British populace for what was seen as evidence of racism by the British government. Coupled with the refusal of the Bamangwato people, in defiance of the British colonial government to elect another chief, Khama and his wife eventually returned to Bechuanaland. Ultimately, he ascended to the centre of Bechuanaland politics, cementing his position in the 1965 elections

(Stevens, 1966: 15). The experience taught Khama that even in relations with more powerful counterparts, it was still possible to insist on one’s principles and where necessary engage in dialogue to reach an acceptable end goal.

To Khama’s administration, non-racialism was intrinsically linked to Botswana’s internal social identity. At the same time, Khama remarked that his foreign policy would be directed by “reason and common sense” (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 426). The independent Botswana sought to make its multiracial democratic identity attractive to the African continent, as well as to those elements that espoused similar values across the world (Henderson, 1990: 43). Botswana showed a level of defiance against its powerful neighbours in this regard. Thus, Gaborone resisted pressures to extend full diplomatic relations to Pretoria and Salisbury,¹¹ refused to accept official aid from apartheid South Africa and began pursuing its own monetary policy in the 1970s. Botswana denied diplomatic recognition to the homelands, thereby eschewing the legitimacy of the Bantustan system in which Pretoria created ethnic homelands as a way of showing that separate development could be achieved (Dale, 1976: 79).

Concurrently, Botswana also pursued a moderate policy towards South Africa, as seen in its decision to remain in the SACU and retain informal diplomatic backchannels for communication with Pretoria (Sekgoma, 1990). This prudence towards South Africa initially failed to inspire confidence from the more radical, anti-imperialist leaders on the continent who saw Botswana as a puppet of South Africa (Henderson, 1990: 43). This perception began to change as Khama drew on his long-standing friendship with President Kaunda of Zambia, who understood Gaborone’s plight as the only black majority-led country that bordered Botswana. Zambia would serve as the interlocutor between Botswana and the rest of Africa, presenting Botswana as a country that favoured the end of white minority rule, but whose proximity to apartheid South Africa and settler-Rhodesia meant it had to be measured in its approach (Masire, 2006: 286-287). Botswana’s search for allies on the continent led it to adopt a non-aligned stance in the Cold War, occasioning the establishment of ties with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1970. Having previously established relations with Japan and West Germany, this mitigated perceptions of radical socialism amongst South Africa and the Western world (Taylor, 1997: 77). In this respect, Botswana’s internal social identity was becoming increasingly apparent.

Seretse Khama’s government positioned itself as a leading member of the Frontline States (FLS). The FLS was a political alliance¹² based on the Lusaka Manifesto, which was the accepted strategy by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1969, on the process of liberating Southern Africa from white minority rale (Niemann, 1993: 29). Gaborone’s geographic positioning was key to the activities of the FLS, but given its proximity to South Africa, Botswana could not allow the liberation war to be waged directly from its territory. However, Botswana did offer asylum to people that fled from tyrannical racist regimes through a revised refugee policy (Osei-Hwedie, 1998: 430). Gaborone facilitated meetings between the FLS and South Africa, at a time when hostilities did not favour direct diplomatic engagements between the parties (Masire, 2006: 275).

Khama played a pivotal role in uniting the FLS politically, by taking the lead in forming the SADCC and investing the majority of human resources for starting up the organisation. SADCC had the effect of advancing the economic development of the FLS by reducing dependency on South Africa (Masire, 2006: 277).

Botswana has been viewed by the international community as a leading example for the forging of multiracial societies and the promotion of liberal democratic ideals in the region. Dale (1976), for example, argues that Botswana was able to embolden its multicultural and non-racial identity to the world by harbouring schools such as Maru-a-Pula, which hosted local students, as well as black and white expatriates (Dale, 1976: 74-75). There had been a paucity of such symbiotic non-racialism in schools within the region following Botswana’s independence. Vice-President Masire, in 1969, while addressing race relations in Francistown, made it clear that anti-racism was intimately linked to Botswana’s principles and objectives that formed part of its internal social identity (Henderson, 1974: 39). The countiy also diplomatically profiled itself in multilateral settings such as at the OAU and at United Nations (UN) fora, to state its case on its geo-political vulnerabilities, while simultaneously demonstrating its commitment to the overall objective of national liberation and support for national liberation movements. Botswana, in projecting itself as a moderate but principled actor, straddled the sharp confrontational divide between South Africa as an internationally supported sub-regional hegemon, and itself, demonstrating that it had evolved its own diplomatic practice of predictable, principled pragmatism, one deeply embedded in its own internal social identity.

Botswana’s conference diplomacy and negotiation skills

Botswana sought to make the most of multilateral conference settings by seeking to promote liberal democratic principles, while simultaneously looking to safeguard its survival through diplomacy and dialogue. Jazbec (2010), Jakobsen in Nasra (2011), and Thorhallsson (2012) demonstrate the role that multilateralism can play in the exercise of soft power, thereby providing small states with the opportunity to affect global agendas. In this respect, Botswana asserted itself in varying contexts against both the apartheid government and its Western allies, as well as radical and anti-imperialist forces. For example, in July 1970, Britain announced that its weapons manufacturers would consider doing business with South Africa. Seretse Khama prioritised this aspect at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Lusaka in September 1970 by publicly playing on the threat of entrenching white minority rule through a British and French anns race in Southern Africa (Tlou, Parsons, & Henderson, 1995: 291). Khama also prudently used the closed sessions of the conference to ease the tensions that had festered due to divergent views (Tlou et al., 1995: 292). He emerged from the conference as a leader who espoused reasonableness and this gave him support amongst liberals who opposed the apartheid regime and Western support for it (Henderson, 1990: 47).

Similarly, Botswana leveraged its growing prestige in the world in what Tsie (1996) refers to as a “shining example of liberal democracy”, and appealed to the

UN Security Council to secure condemnation of violent reprisals emanating from Pretoria and Salisbury in the 1970s and 1980s. Botswana was able to secure a resolution in 1977 condemning Rhodesia for what the Security Council referred to as the actions of an “illegal racist regime” (UN Security Council, 1977). A similar resolution was adopted in June 1985 following a South African Defence Force attack on Gaborone seeking to destroy ANC strongholds (Dale, 1987: 83).

Botswana used its skilfully applied negotiating skills to manipulate its external environment to obtain favourable outcomes on the economic front as well. In the 1970s, South Africa had engaged in a policy of détente, seeking to obtain support from moderate African countries to divide the OAU in its opposition to Pretoria (Barber & Barratt, 1990). In this context, Botswana sought to tilt the terms of the SACU revenue-sharing formula in its favour. Botswana took the lead in the 1969 negotiations on behalf of the BLS states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland). The delegation led by the then Minister of Finance, Quett Masire, was able to solicit the council of economic experts, who armed the Botswanan negotiators with relevant facts and arguments needed to obtain the outcomes sought (Masire, 2006: 257-258). This allowed Botswana to achieve an increase in the revenue formula, which compensated the BLS states for the negative effects of being in SACU, thereby reducing Gaborone’s dependence on British aid (Landell-Mills, 1971:76).

The above examples are illustrative of the positive image fostered by its ruling elite, emanating from Botswana’s internal social identity. This was underpinned by a liberal democratic position on regional and global affairs fundamentally linked to its principles on the promotion of democratic ideals. This position is underscored by domestic considerations such as, inter alia, undisturbed elections, respect for civil liberties and human rights, the promotion of rale of law, and the chastisement of racialised societies and undemocratic bureaucratic machineries within the Southern African region. This disposition over a long period of time earned Botswana a high degree of political goodwill amongst its peers. Botswana has also been driven by its determination to be self-reliant and promote regional and bilateral cooperation. In this, Botswana has drawn upon its skilful diplomatic prowess to package its position in conference settings, appealing to a heterogeneity of audiences. To this end, its diplomats used measured and rational responses—as opposed to the rhetorical and emotive language adopted by some of its Pan-Africanist-African counterparts—as well as formal, businesslike language, as opposed to indulging in symbolic sloganeering. This approach appealed to Africanist and Western liberal audiences alike, and simultaneously gave Gaborone a moderate appearance in its dealings with apartheid South Africa, setting the stage for a less hostile environment for negotiations.