In defiance of African unity?

Malawi's singular and idiosyncratic foreign policy stems from the early postindependence period when Malawi took issue with the OAU’s stance on decolonisation. As Omari and Macaringue (2007) contend, the failure of a negotiated transition to independence in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, the existence of settler colonialism in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the institutionalisation of racism as apartheid in South Africa, brought about the armed struggles for the independence of these territories.

Like many African leaders. President Hastings Banda was supportive of the OAU’s call for the complete liberation of all those countries still under the colonial yoke. This was evident when he openly declared that:

the independence of Malawi would be meaningless as long as there is an inch of African soil under colonialism and imperialism. I share the views already expressed in this conference and elsewhere that all independent African states and all African leaders must do everything possible in their power to help those [southern African] countries which are still under the colonial yoke.

(Banda in Patel & Hajat, 2007: 384)

However, President Banda became disinclined to the idea of Malawi becoming one of the frontline states in the region’s liberation warfare, leaving only Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia eventually to lead what was to become the Frontline States (FLS) movement in the 1970s. The change of foreign policy stance did not necessarily emanate from his personal preferences. It largely came about from him privileging domestic priorities. According to Short (1974), these priorities had to do with Malawi’s socio-economic development plans, including the enhancement of agricultural production, diversification of manufacturing and industrial processing, and measures set in place to eliminate ignorance, disease and poverty.

One way of harnessing resources to support these socio-economic development plans was by choosing to consolidate diplomatic and all other relations with South Africa’s apartheid regime (McMaster, 1974). President Banda openly declared his preferences to “alliances with the devil” (Malawi Government, 1966: 411). As such, his government was the first of all black independent states to formalise diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa (Ihonvbere, 2003), a move that contravened the OAU’s concerted norm for African unity against apartheid. For President Banda, isolating South Africa was "dishonest and devoid of integrity”, perhaps because many African leaders surreptitiously engaged in economic dealings with the apartheid regime (McMaster, 1974: 99). It thus became apparent that President Banda’s main concern with regard to relations with apartheid South Africa centred on the positive socio-economic outcomes diplomatic relations could offer. This became apparent when he argued that “sending a mission, goodwill, trade ... to South Africa [did] not mean [Malawi agreed] with apartheid” (Malawi Government, 1967: 362). Therefore, by proposing that “economic unviability and political instability” (Malawi Government, 1967: 362) constituted the central concerns the continent had to address, Banda was able to isolate his beliefs from those collectively held by the majority of African leaders who regarded colonialism, neo-imperialism and apartheid as main impediments to the continent’s socio-economic and political progress.

President Hastings Banda’s agency in leading Malawi to a foreign policy position out of kilter with the regional and continental consensus was, in the main, underlined by a three-pronged foreign policy approach. This included 1) “non-interference in the affairs of other countries”, 2) an assessment of individual situations based on their merits rather than being held by pre-existing alignments of countries and 3) a willingness to accept the aid of “any country prepared to help Malawi” (Patel & Hajat, 2007: 385). This foreign policy stance in several ways proved beneficial to Malawi’s socio-economic development aspirations. South Africa provided financial assistance to assist in major projects, including the relocation of Malawi's capital from Zomba to Lilongwe and the construction of a railway line connecting Malawi with Mozambique’s port of Nacala, something which eased transport costs and opened up the landlocked Malawi to international markets (Ihonvbere, 2003). Moreover, both South Africa and minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) were prepared to host thousands of Malawian migrant workers in their economically vibrant agricultural and mining sectors (McMaster, 1974).

Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 and with the concomitant emergence of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), Malawi contemplated a switch to have its foreign policy converge with that of the region. According to Gwaradzimba (1993), membership of SADCC was intended to facilitate the realignment of economic relations among and between members, and change the pattern of asymmetrical economic relations with South Africa. President Banda demonstrated agency by embracing the ideals of SADCC as a means to diversify economic relations and moderate Malawi’s heavy reliance on the South African economy. Moreover, the newly formed grouping prioritised transport links, including railway lines, which President Banda believed would serve to unlock Malawi further to international markets through seaports in Mozambique and Tanzania (Kadyampakeni, 1985). For the first time,

Malawi—Convergence and divergence 185 therefore. President Hastings Banda was able to re-identify with fellow leaders of the majority ruled states only because of the broader prospects of socio-economic development that SADCC promised to offer. Nonetheless, membership of SADCC with its aim of economic de-linkage from apartheid South Africa that accompanied the official political and diplomatic isolation of the regime did not prevent Malawi from continuing to maintain diplomatic ties with South Africa. President Banda’s agency in this regard prevailed as most member states both surreptitiously and openly still showed varying degrees of dependence or economic engagement with South Africa (Kadyampakeni, 1985; Gwaradzimba, 1993). Moreover, SADCC’s focus on economic development was initially rhetorical and considered more of a platform upon which to counter South Africa’s regional destabilisation scheme, as evidenced by Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere's pronouncement that:

The basic reason for SADCC’s strength is the political commitment that underlines its existence. For SADCC was created by the Frontline States out of their own felt need; although now it has a somewhat wider membership, the Frontline States still provide its core, are still the guardians of its objectives, and are still its main energies.

(Nyerere in Gwaradzimba, 1993: 52)

Banda’s recalcitrant stance is to be viewed through the lens of pragmatism, necessitated by the country ’ s own relative socio-economic weakness and peripheral status on the continent. Malawi’s foreign policy under President Hastings Banda was “more attuned to low-politics than to political-military geopolitics”, one where political leaders sought to satisfy domestic imperatives rather than to build concern for the people of other states or amity with them (du Plessis, 2006: 132).

A similarly singular foreign policy position by Malawi manifested itself in 2012 during President Joyce Banda’s short tenure of office. Her government defied the spirit of African unity in the wake of the ICC’s demand for the arrest of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir. Malawi’s departure from the common African cause did not only antagonise a July 2009 declaration by the AU, which encouraged member states to boycott the ICC’s demands for "the arrest and surrender of African indicted personalities” (Reuters, 2009). Importantly, it demonstrated considerable agency by Malawian leaders in their ability to isolate the country’s foreign policy choices from those advanced collectively at the continental level. Malawian leaders demonstrated this agency by objecting to President al-Bashir’s attendance of an AU summit planned to take place in Malawi’s capital, Lilongwe, in July 2012. The decision was an intersubjective one, taken by the entire cabinet and supported by members of the political opposition. While acknowledging Malawi's obligations to the AU, the Malawian leaders realised that accommodating the Sudanese leader on Malawian soil would not only contravene the country’s obligation to the Rome Statutes, but would importantly also jeopardise its relations with Western donor countries (The Guardian, 2012). Malawi’s position contradicted that assumed by the majority of African states, which regards the

ICC’s indictment of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity as machinations of the West (Bako, 2012).

With the AU apparently unwilling to accede to Malawi’s position, in solidarity with the Sudanese leader, the summit shifted to Addis Ababa. The AU’s high regard for harmonised state behaviour became apparent when it indicated to Malawi that its leaders did not have any “right to dictate who could attend the sununit” (The Guardian, 2012). This lends credence to the proposition that foreign policy choices of the AU’s member states are often constrained by the multilateral setting. However, the agency of Malawian leaders, it is argued, was underpinned by Resolution 911 of the AU which provides liberty to member states to balance their interests in terms of obligations to the AU and their national interests (Nyasa Times, 2012). In the knowledge of its rights as a member, Malawian leaders chose to override the majority AU view. Following the economic decline that followed President Bingu wa Mutharika’s poor political and economic policies between 2009 and 2012, domestic socio-economic concerns became paramount. Malawian leaders feared that appearing to support the impunity of the perpetrators of human rights abuses by conceding to the AU’s demands could possibly prevent the flow of financial assistance from Western donors and impede Malawi’s socio-economic recovery. This agency on the part of Malawi was emphasised by President Joyce Banda in her argument opposing the AU’s demands:

In the interest of Malawi and Malawians ... I respect that decision [moving the summit to Addis Ababa]. I respect Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir as head of state of Sudan, but ... my main agenda right now is economic recovery. How did the AU support us and who supported us [when the former President Bingu wa Mutharika hosted President al-Bashir the previous year]? And who lost? We lost in the end.

(Capital News, 2012)

Malawi is already going through unprecedented economic problems and it would not be prudent enough to take a risk by allowing one person to come and attend the summit against much resistance from our cooperating partners and donors ... It is about the nation; ... It is not Malawi hosting the summit but rather it is a question of African Heads of State meeting in Malawi. But at the end of the day, Malawi will have to seriously take into consideration the economic repercussions of hosting President al-Bashir in Malawi.

(Nyasa Times, 2012)

The agency shown by Malawian leaders on the issue happened when they were addressing some of the socio-economic failures left by Bingu wa Mutharika’s administration. The near immediate resumption of financial support by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western donor countries, as well as the need for the country to resume having a (relatively) uninterrupted power and electricity supply, were key elements of this. Malawi’s foreign policy position indicated adopting pragmatism over the ritual of keeping up formal inter-African

Malawi—Convergence and divergence 187 governmental relations, that in the short-term threatened the country’s financial and economic welfare.