Embracing African unity

Unlike under the Hastings Banda and Joyce Banda presidencies, Malawi’s foreign policy choices have generally reflected the spirit of collectivism advanced by the AU. Under Presidents Bakili Muluzi, Bingu wa Mutharika and Peter Mutharika, the Malawian leadership showed considerable zeal for African unity. The changing foreign policy context in the period from 1989 to 1994 coincided with some important events at both the regional and domestic level in Malawi. For one, there was the political change towards democracy in South Africa; this effectively removed the basis upon which President Hastings Banda had obtained financial support (Ihonvebere, 2003). At this time, President Banda’s health had also significantly deteriorated and his regime under challenge spelt the re-introduction of a multiparty democracy in 1993.

This political change reshaped Malawi’s foreign policy path. In particular, the country’s new President, Bakili Muluzi, in his resolve to shed Malawi’s image of "pariah statehood” inherited from the country’s go-it-alone foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa, demonstrated agency by trying to build good neighbourly relations. Early in his presidency, he embarked on a series of goodwill missions to several southern African states. In trying to overcome Malawi’s previously tattered image on the continent, Muluzi sought to assure Africa of the country’s commitment to regional cooperation and integration. In the five years of his presidency, his visits to Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe were reciprocated by visits from regional leaders Joaquim Chissano, Benjamin Mkapa, Frederick Chiluba and Robert Mugabe. Close friendships with a number of African leaders, particularly Benjamin Mkapa, Frederick Chiluba and Joaquim Chissano, resulted from these engagements. As Heimann (2012: 30) contends, friendship possesses considerable impact on the foreign policymaking process, because leaders “may know each other well, and share a common worldview and common values. They may support each other regularly in international fora, and enjoy an intense, varied, and close bilateral relationship", hideed, the presence of Presidents Robert Mugabe, Frederick Chiluba, Pierre Buyoya (Burundi), King Mswati III (Swaziland) and Joaquim Chissano at President Muluzi’s wedding in 1999 gave credence to the power of the friendship factor. Arguably, foreign policy in the context of Bakili Muluzi’s presidency was one characterised by a significant affinity towards the region, given further meaning by the strong bonds of friendship that prevailed between him and a number of other (Southern) African leaders. Against the background of family ties and a wider socio-cultural context, this personal friendship factor can be said to have influenced Malawi’s favourable foreign policy stance towards the admonished regime of President Robert Mugabe during the long-standing Zimbabwe crisis.

The personal friendship between President Bingu wa Mutharika and Robert Mugabe formed the basis upon which Malawi's solidarity with Zimbabwe came to be measured. A few months after assuming office in May 2004, President Bingu wa Mutharika openly “assured [President Mugabe] and the people of Zimbabwethat Malawi will stand by [Zimbabwe] and will provide its support in all international and regional issues” (Malawi Government, 2004). President Mutharika’s friendship with President Mugabe manifested itself through reciprocated visits— an extraordinary fifteen visits took place between 2006 and 2010 (Masina, 2006). Wa Mutharika publicly defended his decision to name a road in Malawi after the Zimbabwean leader even though this proved unpopular and was mainly opposed by many of Malawi's civil rights groups and the Western community. President wa Mutharika argued:

Who else, and I repeat, who else is more eligible to have this honour of this highway than Comrade Robert Mugabe? There [are] many streets in Malawi named after colonialists perhaps for killing more blacks... Here we are, we have a hero, an African hero, and someone in his proper sense of mind, born here in Malawi, will come and say ‘‘no it is not right and proper to honour Robert Mugabe”. Are you serious? If we cannot honour Robert Mugabe and other true sons of Africa, who can we honour? Europeans we don’t know? When are we going to end colonial domination?

(Mutharika in Masina, 2006)

Moreover, the aspect of the prevalence of mixed marriages between the peoples of Malawi and Zimbabwe reflects the socio-cultural context that informed Malawi’s solidarity with Zimbabwe. President Bingu wa Mutharika himself had married a Zimbabwean woman, Ethel Zvauya. As a consequence he maintained some property (Bineth Trust) and held financial shares with one of the leading commercial banks in Zimbabwe. In turn, it is widely believed that President Mugabe’s father was an immigrant from Malawi. These cases reveal the prevalence of intermarriage arrangements between the peoples of Malawi and Zimbabwe, which mainly resulted from patterns of economic migration and settlement in Zimbabwe (Mashiri, 2002). The unofficial but common identification of a specific population of Zimbabweans seen as being of Malawian origin (Mabeza, 2017) reinforces the depth of sociocultural relations between the peoples of the two countries. The existence of mixed marriages can be argued to have significantly increased the probability of social cohesion (Smits, 2010), which can be seen to be an intervening factor in helping to shape Malawi’s foreign policy choices on the issue of Zimbabwe.

The apparent indifference with which the Bingu wa Mutharika administration treated the Zimbabwe issue at a time when thousands of Malawians came to be displaced following the land reform programme started in the late 1990s seemingly did not disturb the continuing amity between the two leaders. Significantly, not only did this speak to the depth of socio-cultural integration of Malawians in Zimbabwe society, but also to Malawian fears of the economic fallout from Zimbabwe deciding on a mass repatriation of large numbers of Malawians. These fears were expressed by a former Cabinet Minister, Patricia Kaliati:

should Malawi interfere with internal matters of Zimbabwe? If some countries have problems with Zimbabwe, that should not concern Malawi. Zimbabwe has been a friend of Malawi for a long time and it is playing host to over five million Malawians. If we quarrel with Mugabe, where will these Malawians go? Will some of these Western countries host them? Malawi is a sovereign state fully entitled to choose its friends freely.

(Kaliati in Masina, 2006)

With the exception of President Muluzi who, in 2001, as chairperson at one SADC summit said that the negative effects of the Zimbabwe crisis would affect the entire region (Berries, 2002), Malawian leaders have, in the main, demonstrated significant reluctance to admonish the Mugabe regime over the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe. Malawi’s approach to Zimbabwe can be said to have subsisted within a multilateral context defined by SADC’s quest for regional solidarity. This reflected a particular strategic culture in the leaders’ considerable resolve to disregard external (Western) influence on (Southern) African issues. This became apparent when Malawi’s former Foreign Minister, Lilian Patel, dismissed Western pressure on SADC to act against President Robert Mugabe by arguing that “SADC would not go along with (the) evil machinations of some Western powers using the neo-colonialist press locally and internationally” [to criticise President Mugabe]. “SADC would remain on Zimbabwe’s side because blood is thicker than water” (Patel in Sachikonye, 2005: 573).

Perhaps because of the amity between Presidents Bingu wa Mutharika and Robert Mugabe, the British government attempted to persuade the Malawian leader to directly confront President Mugabe regarding the controversial land reform programme and human rights abuses. However, President Bingu wa Mutharika disregarded this attempt and emphasised the centrality of African unity within SADC’s multilateral context by holding that:

The British government has always wanted me to speak out against Robert Mugabe, but I have always kept quiet, because during one SADC summit, we agreed that we should speak with one voice through SADC and not just individually. And for your own information, you should know that SADC is a highly disciplined entity .. .We [Malawi] shall always speak through SADC and not on our own.

(Malawi ruler blasts Britain ..., 2009)

Malawi's position resulted from the country’s professed commitment to regional integration, which it considers vital for socio-economic development. As former Foreign Affairs Minister Davis Katsonga argued:

Malawi’s participation in SADC affairs has a huge potential to assist in fulfilling the mission and objective [of the country]. This is because SADC has developed a very comprehensive regional integration agenda which Malawi has already benefitted from.... There is high potential for additional development opportunities in the medium to long term.

(Malawi Government, 2006)

Malawian leaders had thus, at this time, following the difficult years of pariah statehood under President Hastings Banda, come to see SADC (and in all probability the AU) as an important vehicle for re-establishing Malawi’s regional credibility. Importantly, SADC also came to be regarded as a crucial platform on which Malawi’s socio-economic development aspirations could be promoted. Malawi’s regard for the convergence of its foreign policy interests with other (Southern) African states is also explained by the social unity among its leaders, expressed in them cooperating against (Western) external influence. Ani (2015) sees this within a context where there are growing misgivings about external interventions in Africa, as well as the dominant belief and activism among African thinkers and politicians that only African oriented solutions can secure lasting solutions to Africa’s challenges.