The fallout with Zimbabwe

Botswana drew on its principles and long-standing credentials as an example of liberal democracy in the region, when Zimbabwe plummeted into crisis in 2008. Ian Khama stated that with regard to events in Zimbabwe, Botswana ascribed to the principles of good neighbourliness and the sovereignty of nations, as well as regional and global norms (Badza, 2009: 166). While Mogae’s previous government had been critical of Mugabe’s administration since 2002, it was cautious not to appear too antagonistic and sought to engage with Mugabe through exerting limited pressure in private, in what came to be known as “quiet diplomacy”. Ian Khama departed from this approach and actively criticised the 2008 Zimbabwean elections, seen as irregular and unfair with a large degree of violence and intimidation against members and supporters of the opposition

Botswana's constructivist foreign policy 149 parties (Jonas, Mandiyanike, & Maundeni, 2013: 2). When the results were finally released after being withheld for an extended period of time, no party had acquired more than 50% of the vote, necessitating a run-off election (Nathan. 2012: 71). Ian Khama’s government—along with Levy Mwanawasa’s Zambian government—stood as lone voices in SADC, condemning Mugabe for seizing power through corrupt elections. Botswana announced that it would not recognise the govermnent that Mugabe was on the point of forming, as the country had violated the principles of the AU, SADC and the UN. Ian Khama’s government also recommended that Zimbabwe be barred from attending meetings at the SADC and AU levels (Badza. 2009, 166).

While the AU had failed to overtly condemn Mugabe’s regime for its conduct, Botswana, like no other in the region, provided leadership in defending liberal democratic principles regarding individual freedoms and the holding of free elections—principles that were entrenched as part of its internal social identity. By doing so, it aligned itself with the concerns of similarly minded elites in Zambia, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, who all conveyed concerns about the legitimacy of Mugabe’s govermnent (Pambazuka News, 23 June 2008). Ultimately, a peace was brokered by South Africa, which saw Zimbabwe administered by a Government of National Unity (GNU), allowing for Morgan Tsvangirai to be sworn in as Prime Minister (Mmegi Online, 25 November 2008). While South Africa played a very important role in the formation of the GNU, Jonas et al. (2013) have credited Botswana’s principled stand against the counter-democratic developments in Zimbabwe as having averted the prospect of civil war in the country, an event that would have had wide repercussions for the sub-continent and a wider world.

The AU and ICC crisis

Where multilateral fora have been at odds with Botswana's principled position on the promotion of liberal democratic ideals and the protection of human rights, Botswana has been willing to stand in opposition to collective decision-making processes. Under the stewardship of Ian Khama’s administration, the country came to be at variance with the AU on the issue of the ICC. At times, this left the countiy in the political wilderness, trumpeting a principled stance that offended the collective voice of the institution.

Many African countries had initially been optimistic about the role the ICC could play in addressing the unchecked impunity associated with the large-scale carnage and human rights abuses historically visited upon the African populace, as endorsed by the AU’s Peace and Security Council (Tladi, 2009: 59, Murithi, 2013: 2). These states, however, were disillusioned with the ICC when questions of its universal applicability began to arise. The Court, in the pursuit of its prosecution efforts, came to be accused of singling out the African continent. The accusation was odd in that African states themselves, on various occasions, had referred cases to the ICC. The recommendation from the Security Council on the issue of an arrest warrant for a sitting president. President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan, for crimes against humanity, incensed African leaders. It ledto a resolution that effectively shielded Al-Bashir from surrendering himself to the ICC (Sibalukliulu & Louw, 2010).

In projecting a dissenting view, Botswana stressed its commitment to the Rome Statute that had established the ICC. It further lamented that the AU was not acting in the interests of the Sudanese victims of conflict. In unequivocal terms, Botswana declared that it would arrest Al-Bashir. Later on, the declaration also covered Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi (The Namibian, 8 July 2011). While South Africa remained silent on the issue, Malawi joined Botswana in taking a principled stance against Al-Bashir, leading to the 19th AU Summit being moved from Lilongwe to Addis Ababa in July 2012 (BBC News, 12 June 2012). Botswana also found allies in other AU states such as Niger, Gabon, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, who supported cooperation with the ICC, and like Botswana, considered the Court to have some relevance and value for international justice (Aggad & Apiko, 2016).¹⁸ It is, however, also evident that Botswana did not always nor easily find allies amongst other African elites for the positions it took. It is therefore believed that its stance was detrimental to Botswana soliciting African endorsement for the positions of Secretary General of the Commonwealth in 2015 and Chairperson of the AU Commission in 2016 (Jimson, 2016; Keorapetse, 2016).